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Part I. 
Cumulus 
 
Introduction and Summary 
This thesis consists of three main studies that cover complementary aspects of action-to-perception 
transfer. In the recent decades, cognitive psychology has started a paradigm shift from its traditional 
approach to put the stimulus first and treat the action as response to a less one-directional view of 
perception and action. Quite trivially, action influences perception by changing the external world: we 
move objects, we locomote or we move our sensory organs. More crucially, action also influences 
perception internally. Study II and III will address this question directly, by studying perceptual effects 
of action on physically unchanged stimuli. Study I deals with biological motion. I will argue that the 
perception of biological motion may present a naturalistic example for direct action-to-perception 
transfer. The cues of animate locomotion are detected rapidly and effortlessly, and allow quick retrieval 
of detailed information about the actor, as we related to our immense experience with moving our own 
bodies in ways that correspond to the physical “laws” which the dynamics of these cues represent. In 
sum, the studies reported in this thesis provide novel insight on shared action-perception 
representations, their perceptual consequences and their relation to cognitive models of the world. 
In Study I, we showed that biological motion cues distort the perceived size of the actor’s figure: a 
biological motion stimulus is perceived larger than matched control stimuli and lets subsequent stimuli 
appear smaller. Provided the importance of biological motion, this is in line with other studies that 
relate subjective importance to perceived size – however, the connection with animate motion has not 
been reported earlier. If there are shared action-perception representations, do they operate on different 
representational levels? In study II, we coupled a stimulus that was in competition with another to 
action more or less strongly. While the degree of action-perception coupling did not affect overt reports 
of stimulus’ visibility, oculomotor measures were modulated. This suggests different degrees of action 
perception coupling on different representational levels, with varying access to awareness. Does in turn 
the internal cognitive model of the world penetrate action perception coupling? In study III, we showed 
that the effect of action-perception congruency on perceptual stability critically depends on the internal 
cognitive model of action perception coupling. Studies II and III together indicate that no single 
mechanism or representation can account for all action-perception findings. In the general discussion, I 
will consider the needed adjustments to current models as well as alternative theoretical approaches. 
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1. Biological motion perception 
For terrestrial animals, the most important feat to recognize is the locomotion of others, the majority of 
whom are legged creatures. Whether potential prey, predator, mate or a fellow gatherer to share tasks 
with, recognizing their motion has arguably been crucial for our highly social species throughout its 
evolutionary history. There are certain levels of this process, starting with recognition, but going far 
beyond that: from its motion only, we are able to retrieve information about physical as well as 
personal properties of the actor. 
If we consider our normal visual sensory input impoverished (which is to be interpreted in relation to 
the amount of useful information we are able to retrieve from it), the most common biological motion 
display will certainly illustrate the logic behind this assumption. Used first by Johansson (1973; 1976), 
point-light displays depict the movements of the human body’s major joints in a highly condensed way. 
From the 2-dimensional motion of a few dots, we are able to readily recognize complex actions, 
without any surface information and with no explicitly defined structural connection between the dots. 
 
 
Figure 1. Point-light figures. Note that in an orthographic rendering, there are two possible 
interpretations due to depth-ambiguity – the illustrations here highlight only one of them. (Text and 
images have been modified. Source: Vanrie, Dekeyser, & Verfaillie, 2004) 
 
Beyond simple recognition, we are also able to rapidly detect biological motion stimuli, which carries 
obvious functional significance. As Johansson (1973) anticipated, this ability seems to be “… a highly 
mechanical, automatic type of visual data treatment.” This ability can even be observed when the 
configural information (structure from motion) that is available in a point-light walker as described 
above is removed by spatially scrambling the dots, resulting in an isolation of local motion cues. In a 
search-task, Wang, Zhang, He and Jiang (2010) found a search advantage of such spatially scrambled 
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point-light walkers. That is in line with other studies which demonstrated incidental processing of 
biological motion stimuli (Thornton & Vuong, 2004) and a rapid modulation of attention by local 
biological motion cues (Wang, Yang, Shi, & Jiang, 2014) – reinforcing Johansson’s original hunch. 
Point-light walkers do not only draw attention to themselves, but also orient it towards their direction 
of translation, as demonstrated by Shi, Weng, He, and Jiang (2010). While some studies emphasize the 
importance of local motion cues in the processing of point-light figures (Chang & Troje, 2009; Mather, 
Radford, & West, 1992; Saunderes, Suchan, & Troje, 2009; Troje & Westhoff, 2006; Wang et al., 
2014), others show that global aspects can be important as well (e.g. Beintema & Lappe, 2002; 
Bertenthal & Pinto, 1994; Coulson, 2004; Cutting, 1981; Lange & Lappe, 2006; Neri, Morrone, & 
Burr, 1998; Shiffrar, Lichtey, & Heptulla-Chatterjee, 1997). This makes it clear that both play a role, 
and probably the most important aspect of the global-local debate is that different cues can contribute 
in complementary as well as interchangeable manners, suggesting that biological motion should not be 
treated as a single phenomenon but rather as a combination of many different aspects (Troje, 2008; 
Troje, 2013). 
Indeed, elements to consider seem plentiful. Aside from recognition, rapid detection, and evocation of 
attentional orienting, biological motion cues are related to a host of detailed information that observers 
can correctly identify about the actor. Only a couple of examples are the detection of gender from the 
motion of faces (Hill & Johnston, 2001) and from the motion of other parts of the body (Kozlowski & 
Cutting, 1977; Mather & Murdoch, 1994; although see also Pollick, Lestou, Ryu, & Cho, 2002), 
identification of affect (Atkinson, Tunstall, & Dittrich, 2007; Ikeda & Watanabe, 2009; Pollick, 
Paterson, Bruderlin, & Sanford, 2001) and identity (Loula, Prasad, Harber, & Shiffrar, 2005; Troje, 
Westhoff, & Lavrov, 2005). 
This multiplicity makes it difficult to give an overarching explanation for the phenomenon. Where do 
these complex skills originate from? One approach is perceptual: since comprehension of the actions of 
other animals around us is paramount, we evolved to have outstanding visual abilities in this regard, 
already from an early age (Fox & McDaniel, 1982; Pavlova, Krageloh-Mann, Sokolov, & Birbaumer, 
2001), maybe even from birth (Simion, Regolin, & Bulf, 2008; Vallortigara, Regolin, & Marconato, 
2005). Some basic cues in biological motion draw attention in an incidental fashion and lead the 
observer to quickly recognize an animate agent. Then, action-specific details are recognized through a 
slower perceptual mechanism, where bottom-up processing of distinctive traits and top-down effects of 
Part I. – Cumulus   
 
7 
knowledge interact (Troje, 2008; Zacks, 2004) likely in a hierarchical manner (e.g. Ahissar & 
Hochstein, 2004; Hemeren, 2008). 
Another possible explanation might be related to our own experience with similar actions. Note that 
this explanation is not necessarily at odds with the one outlined in the previous paragraph, but 
depending on the theoretical viewpoint, may involve crucial differences. Biological movement patterns 
are largely governed by the principles of biomechanics and physics. For example, the two-thirds power 
law, first reported for handwriting and drawing movements (Lacquaniti, Terzuolo, & Viviani, 1983), 
describes that the velocity of movements increases with the radius of curvature, and applies to the 
motion of walking (Ivanenko, Grasso, Macellari, & Lacquaniti, 2002) as well as to motion perception 
(Flach, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2004). Also, Fitts’s law, which describes a speed/accuracy trade-off in 
movement, can be observed in perceptual decisions too (Grosjean, Shiffrar, & Knoblich, 2007). 
Similarly, the perceptual advantage in recognizing one’s own movements (e.g. Knoblich & Flach, 
2001; Loula et al., 2005) and in recognizing movements that the observer is experienced in executing 
(Beets, Rösler, & Fiehler, 2010; Casile & Giese, 2006; Hecht, Vogt, & Prinz, 2001) suggests that 
knowledge about the kinematics of a specific movement can carry over from execution to perception. 
Most interestingly, the inverse of this statement also appears to be true: a lack of (recent) experience in 
locomotion impairs its perception (Arrighi, Cartocci, & Burr, 2011). 
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Practical outlook I – representation of gravity 
The importance of gravity in the perception of biological motion displays seems clear from the 
inversion effect (Sumi, 1984) – when point-light walkers are inverted, the amount of represented 
visual information remains equal compared to that in upright displays, yet many of the 
previously listed perceptual abilities related to these figures disappear. The reason might be that 
the acceleration patterns of the inverted movements (Troje & Westhoff, 2006) represent a 
situation (negative gravity) that is never observed in reality. Experimental data on imagery of 
biological motion are scarce (but for some related findings, see Deen & McCarthy, 2010; 
Grosman & Blake, 2001; Miller & Saygin, 2013), and it would be particularly difficult to design 
a study where the gravity-related visual cues could be studied separately in imagery. In the 
perception of the movements of external objects, we seem to incorporate the effects of gravity 
accurately (e.g. Jörges & López-Moliner, 2017; Lacquaniti, Carrozzo, & Borghese, 1993), 
suggesting that we might have a fairly precise internal model of it. However, the recent study of 
Gravano, Zago, and Lacquaniti (2017) shows that in imagery, we do not account for gravity, as 
if this internal model was not functioning appropriately, or was detached from imagery. This 
may well explain some of the differences in efficiency of imagery training in various sports 
(Hall, Rodgers, & Barr, 1990; Sheikh & Korn, 1994), and the accounts of gymnasts where skills 
with prolonged air-time regularly fail in imagery while they succeed in reality. This is in 
contrast with the finding that athletes often imagine winning and rarely imagine losing (Hall et 
al., 1990) – suggesting that there is indeed more to the phenomenon than pessimism. Repeated 
failures in imagery might in turn affect the confidence of the athlete and studies like that of 
Gravano and colleagues (2017) might help to understand why this experience is to be expected. 
Similarly, coaches usually instruct athletes to “use all senses” in imagery practice, while this 
may not always be appropriate. Mentally practicing a sequence that tends to fail in imagery but 
succeed in reality might nevertheless be effective in a modality-specific manner: the landing 
inevitably fails as gravity and the related timing is not incorporated properly in the imagery – 
but in all other respects, the sequence of the movements can be practiced correctly if the athlete 
understands that the purpose of this practice is not the timing of the landing but everything else. 
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Undeniably, the kinematic cues that help us quickly recognize the locomotion of legged animals from 
their visual appearance are the ones that we have most behavioral experience with. The ballistic 
acceleration pattern of the feet allows us to identify legged animals of all kinds (Troje & Westhoff, 
2006), and we also effectively guess the size of an animal from its stride frequency (Jokisch & Troje, 
2003), thanks to the universal physical properties of pendulums under constant gravity. Practicing this 
very same movement several thousand times a day (Althoff et al., 2017; Bassett et al., 2010) might be 
an explanation for the generalized filter-like properties of our perceptual “life-detector” (Troje & 
Westhoff, 2006). 
 
2. Mechanisms of motor and perceptual resonance 
The existence of our remarkable perceptual abilities regarding biological motion stimuli does not 
explain, however, how a motor experience transfers to perception. So far we have seen that the actions 
of animate beings are perceived with high efficiency and I argued that one possible reason behind this 
is that we have much experience with similar movements. Furthermore, there is ample evidence that 
such effects are not even restricted to biological types of motion. Action (or planned action, see e.g. 
Fagioli, Hommel, & Schubotz, 2007) can increase sensitivity to perceptual events that share some 
features with the action both concurrently (on-line) and with temporal difference (off-line). This has 
been demonstrated with ambiguous stimuli in the visual (Beets, et al., 2010; Mitsumatsu, 2009; 
Wohlschläger, 2000) and auditory (e.g. Repp & Knoblich, 2007) domains, as well as in imagery 
(Wexler, Kosslyn, & Berthoz, 1998; Wohlschläger & Wohlschläger, 1998). While binocular rivalry 
shows some differences from tasks with ambiguous displays, the on-line action-to-perception transfer 
effect appears similarly in that paradigm, too (Di Pace & Saracini, 2014; Maruya, Yang, & Blake, 
2007), or even with unambiguous stimuli that show high perceptual uncertainty (Keetels & 
Stekelenburg, 2014). 
The theories of common coding (Prinz, 1997) and event coding (Müsseler, 1999; Hommel, Müsseler, 
Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001) provide a framework for these findings. Since data suggest that there is a 
generalized connection (with varying specificity, depending on the task and stimulus) between the 
motor and perceptual domains, these theories imply that both motor and perceptual events are coded in 
a common representation. This representation only applies to the events’ most substantial actuality; 
their details are coded peripherally, allowing for the varying degree of generalization that we have 
found in the available experimental evidence. Thus, the theories do not elaborate on the distal part of 
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possible mechanisms (i.e., early sensory processes and late motor processes), but define the connection 
between domains as a bidirectional flow of information at a central level (theory of event coding), 
where late stages of perception and early stages of action share a common representational domain 
(common coding). 
So far, our best evidence about the mechanisms that lie behind the information transfer comes from 
studies on the mirror neuron system (di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992) and 
show similar activation of premotor cortical areas in macaques both when an action is observed and 
when it is performed. Although more debatable, humans might function similarly (Calvo-Merino, 
Glaser, Grezes, Passingham, & Haggard, 2005; Calvo-Merino, Grezes, Glaser, Passingham, & 
Haggard, 2006). These studies led to a wide, though not very accurately defined (Uithol, Rooij, 
Bekkering, & Haselager, 2011), use of the term “motor resonance”, which entails that observation of 
actions leads to an internal mirroring that underlies action understanding. This same process, on the 
other hand, is not unidirectional and so, “perceptual resonance” (the way self-generated action leads to 
an influence on perception; Schütz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007) can be viewed in a similar framework.  
 
3. On what level of processing is the connection between action and perception? 
While early theories in cognitive psychology treated cognitive processes as linear series of stages (e.g. 
Sternberg, 1969), where each stage has to end before the next stage would begin, the common coding 
and event coding approach allows interaction between (partially) linear processes at their highest 
levels. But where exactly are these levels in a functional sense? The picture we get from the literature is 
not conclusive. Many studies agree that performed (or imagined) action and the perceptual task need to 
have a shared dimension for the transfer to take place (e.g. Beets et al., 2010; Keetels & Stekelenburg, 
2014; Wexler et al., 1998; Wohlschläger, 2000; Wohlschläger & Wohlschläger, 1998). In case of 
studies using mental tasks, there is no kinesthetic information to possibly bias perception; furthermore, 
due to the necessity of a shared dimension, top-down control likely plays a role. This is interpreted as a 
process that is similar to attentional capture and named “action capture” by Wohlschläger (2000). 
However, the shared dimensions in these studies could as well be due to a low-level matching (e.g., the 
direction or orientation of the events). In the study of Beets and colleagues (2010), participants reported 
their percept of an ambiguous rotating cylinder by either button presses, or by rotating a manipulandum 
lever congruently or incongruently to the percept. Results from the manipulandum rotation conditions 
revealed a congruency effect (stabilization of the percept with congruent motion as compared to 
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incongruent motion), which replicated the findings of Wohlschläger (2000). More interestingly, in an 
additional condition where percept was reported by button presses while concurrent manual rotation 
was performed, the action with the manipulandum in a predefined direction did not affect the stability 
of the percept. This control condition of concurrent, but task-irrelevant, action could give stronger 
support for the idea that a low-level information flow cannot account for the findings. A possible issue 
though is that this study used a dual-task for task-irrelevant action conditions only and not for task-
relevant action conditions. In the study of Maruya and colleagues (2007), the binocular rivalry 
paradigm allowed for separately testing effects when the stimulus was dominant vs when it was 
suppressed from awareness. Their results, showing an effect of action also on the suppressed stimulus, 
strongly argue for the possibility of a low-level action-to-perception transfer that is outside of top-down 
control. 
So far, no study has shown a clear dissociation between higher and lower relative levels of processing 
that could unequivocally point to the stage where the shared representations of the common coding 
theory take place, leaving this part of the model relatively speculative. 
 
4. Experimental studies 
All three studies included in this thesis measure perceptual biases, which are caused by action. In all 
the presented experiments, visual stimulation remains unchanged (or matched in its physical properties, 
as in Study I) between conditions, supplying a control that unequivocally points to the internal nature 
of the measured biases. 
Here, I introduce the three studies on a basic level, including their results and the immediate aspects of 
their interpretations. Also included are some considerations, which did not make part of the articles, but 
may be relevant to the conclusions of the dissertation. Aside from these latter points, the article 
manuscripts in Part II should be consulted for detailed descriptions. General conclusions regarding 
what the studies reveal about the inner workings behind the effects are given in the final section of Part 
I. 
Study I (Veto, Einhäuser, & Troje, 2017) demonstrates that an abstract depiction of the most basic form 
of locomotive action in human life, bipedal walking, is perceived as taking up more physical space than 
an ecologically invalid depiction of the very same movement. In three experiments, we (i) quantified 
the phenomenon, (ii) offered a controlled replication to verify that it is indeed the motion and not any 
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static aspect of the stimulus that drives the perceptual bias, and (iii) showed that the perceptual 
distortion can also be measured indirectly, through a carry-over to simple stimuli. 
Study II (Veto, Schütz, & Einhäuser, in press) assesses the effects of the viewer’s own movement on 
the perception of a stimulus that is more or less related to the performed action. A continuous flash-
suppression paradigm with eye-tracking allowed us to capture not only the conscious percept of the 
observers, as expressed in their subjective self-reports, but also the objective measure of their eye-
movements which were directly related to the target stimulus. By using this paradigm, we tackled a 
lower level of action-perception coupling than earlier studies which showed effects of an on-line 
action-to-perception transfer. The finding that in our paradigm, action only affected eye-movements but 
not the reported percept, gives novel insight into how action can affect perception on different levels of 
processing and demonstrates a dissociation between various courses of the transfer. 
In Study III (Veto, Uhlig, Troje, & Einhäuser, submitted manuscript), we manipulated our test 
participants’ cognitive models of the coupling between their own actions and the actions’ perceivable 
outcomes. By inducing the assumption of different coupling mechanisms, we measured whether the on-
line action-to-perception transfer was merely a result of a direct information flow from one domain to 
the other or if cognition could penetrate this process. Results showed that the internal model of the 
viewer plays a significant role in the action-to-perception transfer, which further supports the notion 
that the transfer does not take place on one specific level, but rather on several different levels of 
processing. 
 
Study I: Veto, P., Einhäuser, W., & Troje, N. F. (2017). Biological motion distorts size perception. 
Scientific Reports, 7(10), 42576; doi: 10.1038/srep42576 
 
Rationale – Study I 
Size illusions, where the spatial dimensions of a stimulus are systematically misjudged, can be 
observed in a wide variety of visual scenarios. Classic examples operate by using simple stimuli to 
exploit the principles of size constancy and size contrast. In the former, an object of a given retinal size 
will be perceived as larger, if the assumed viewing distance of the object is greater, as opposed to when 
it is perceived to be closer to the viewer. Powerful demonstrations of this phenomenon, as e.g. the 
Ponzo illusion, use stimuli that are of the same size, yet they appear different to us due to the 3rd 
dimension that is implied in the image. Size contrast, on the other hand, refers to situations where an 
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object appears in the proximity of another, differently sized object. Here, no depth is apparent in the 
image, but an incidental comparison between the objects leads to the distortion. This comparison can 
happen simultaneously (as in the Ebbinghaus/Titchener illusion) or with a temporal delay between 
presentation of the two objects, creating a size adaptation aftereffect (Polsinelli, Milanesi, & Ganesan, 
1969). 
A less known group of perceptual distortions in size judgments, however, operate on higher levels of 
perception, using object properties that are of internal nature: in sum, an object that is of special interest 
to the viewer tends to look larger, and there is a (sometimes bidirectional) relation between perceived 
size and subjective value (e.g. Blaker & van Vugt, 2014; Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky, 2011; Duguid & 
Goncalo, 2012; Marsh, Yu, Schechter, & Blair, 2009; Masters, Poolton, & van der Kamp, 2010; Meier, 
Robinson, & Caven, 2008; Murray & Schmitz, 2011; Silvera, Josephs, & Giesler, 2002; Yap, Mason, 
& Ames, 2013; Veltkamp, Aarts, & Custers, 2008). These phenomena would fit the general definition 
of illusions; however, due to reasons explained below, they are usually not referred to as such. 
Although several studies have shown effects of this category, they are typically also not even 
mentioned along with the previous examples that were based on size contrast and constancy. This may 
be due to their subliminal character: instead of a simple demonstration, this category of perceptual 
distortions requires some kind of measurement to become obvious. Furthermore – and theoretically 
more interestingly – while the former group of illusions relies on visual cues that are part of the visual 
scene and, under normal circumstances, help us make better perceptual judgments, the latter group of 
perceptual distortions originate from some internalized property of the stimulus. 
Biological motion stimuli are universally important, as shown by that they are perceived rapidly 
(Johansson, 1976; Jokisch, Daum, Suchan, & Troje, 2005; Wang et al., 2014) and incidentally 
(Thornton & Vuong, 2004; Veto, Thill, & Hemeren, 2013), we have an innate sensitivity to perceiving 
biological motion (Simion et al., 2008; Vallortigara et al., 2005), and human observers are able to 
retrieve nuanced details about the performer of the motion (Barclay, Cutting, & Kozlowski, 1978; 
Montepare, Goldstein, & Clausen, 1987; Troje et al., 2005). Given the above, our hypothesis logically 
follows: if important stimuli tend to seem larger to the observer and biological motion stimuli 
inherently enjoy preferential processing in the visual system, then biological motion stimuli are also 
likely to appear larger than a matched control stimulus. We investigated this question in three 
experiments. 
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Paradigm – Study I 
First, we tested sixteen participants in a paradigm, where for each trial they briefly viewed a target 
figure followed by a mask to prevent reliance on afterimages. Then, in an adjustment task, participants 
indicated the size of the previously seen figure both in width and in height. The target figure varied in 
size (but kept its natural proportions) and consisted of a point-light walker from a frontal view, with 
either upright or inverted orientation. We found that the upright displays were perceived as 
significantly larger than the inverted, but otherwise identical, control stimuli. 
 
 
Figure 2. Paradigm, Study I, Experiment 1. Sequence of a single trial (here with upright point-light 
walker). 
 
Point-light figures present motion stimuli by eliminating the effects of surface cues and also reducing 
the amount of configural information in the display. Local motion cues, particularly of the limbs, play a 
crucial role in detecting biological motion (Hirai, Chang, Saunders, & Troje, 2011; Troje & Chang, 
2013; Troje & Westhoff, 2006). Since acceleration – driven by gravity – is of major importance in the 
detection of these cues (Chang & Troje, 2009), inverted figures present an ecologically impossible and 
thus invalid constellation. Furthermore, the global configuration of the walker also exhibits an 
inversion effect (Troje & Westhoff, 2006). Consequently, inverting the target stimulus serves as ideal 
control, where all physical properties of the stimulus remain equal, but the motion cues lose their 
ecological relevance and do not elicit the same kind of preferential visual processing as upright walkers 
do. However, due to the inversion effect on the global configuration, our results so far left the question 
point-light walker
250 ms
random dot mask 
200 ms
adjustment task 
(width & height)
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open, whether the measured distortion in perceived size was due to the biological motion cues in the 
display, or the configurational difference between upright and inverted figures. 
In a second experiment, we therefore tested twenty-four participants in a similar paradigm, where the 
original stimuli were extended by the additional condition of static displays (with both upright and 
inverted orientations). Here, we found no difference in size judgments on static figures, while the 
dynamic trials replicated the findings of our first experiment. 
In a third experiment, we eliminated the possibility of an unknown response bias that could affect 
upright walkers differently than inverted ones. If the upright displays appear larger indeed, then 
subsequent stimuli should be perceived as smaller due to a size contrast effect, as described earlier. 
Participants viewed a pair of point-light walkers (one of them always upright, the other inverted), 
followed by the target stimuli (a pair of simple discs; see Figure 3). While the point-light figures were 
fixed in size, the relative diameters of the two targets varied in five conditions. Participants were 
explicitly instructed to ignore the point-light figures and only focus on the task, in which they had to 
pick the larger of the two discs. Results showed that target discs were indeed judged less frequently as 
the larger of the pair, when they were preceded by the upright walker. 
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Figure 3. Paradigm and results, Study I, Experiment 3. Paradigm (top): Sequence of a single trial 
(here with upright point-light walker in the lower position and inverted point-light walker in the upper 
position. Results (bottom): Percent of responses indicating that the target preceded by an upright walker 
was larger plotted against the difference between target (disc) sizes. Means per condition with fitted 
psychometric function. Error bars show s.e.m. Asterisks indicate significant difference of point of 
subjective equality at p < 0.01. 
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General results – Study I 
The three experiments together provide evidence of a distortion in size perception caused by biological 
motion cues. This is in line with the literature that shows how biological motion stimuli are processed 
preferentially by the visual system at an early stage (Jokisch et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2014), eliciting 
incidental processing (Thornton & Vuong, 2004) and reflexive attentional orienting (Shi et al., 2010). 
Since our experiments were the first of their kind, some possible vulnerabilities of the interpretation 
still need to be mentioned. 
To avoid a possible effect of hemispatial asymmetries due to an interaction between the attentional 
orienting response and local vs global processing (Van Vleet, Hoang-duc, DeGutis, & Robertson, 
2011) we used a laterally symmetric design, both with regards to the walkers (facing towards or away 
from the viewer, instead being viewed from the side) as well as to the relationship between the displays 
(see Figures 2 & 3). This way, however, our results might be connected to the facing-the-viewer bias 
(Vanrie, Dekeyser, & Verfaillie, 2004), which posits that the depth ambiguity of point-light walkers is 
more likely to be resolved with the interpretation of the walker facing the viewer and translating 
towards him or her than with the interpretation of the walker facing away from the viewer. Our 
experiments cannot answer whether such a connection exists – nevertheless, if it does, the causal 
direction between the two phenomena would also be unclear. 
Results of the first experiment might as well be explained by assuming that the contours of the body are 
‘filled-in’ for the upright walkers, but not for the inverted ones, which would also make the upright 
figures appear larger. Based on this reasoning, on the other hand, results of the second experiment 
would be difficult to interpret, since the human shape is clearly recognizable in the static stimuli as 
well. Further experimentation with spatially scrambled walkers or with the isolated motion of the limbs 
could possibly resolve this issue. 
Finally, one point that we did not yet consider at the time of choosing our stimulus, is the possible role 
of sex differences. Our stimulus was based on the movements of a male actor (Vanrie & Verfaillie, 
2004), while our participant population was dominantly females. Women might be more sensitive to 
perceiving biological motion stimuli (Anderson et al., 2013), and masculine traits and displayed social 
power could also drive an increase in perceived size (e.g. Murray & Schmitz, 2006; Blaker & van 
Vugt, 2014; Yap et al., 2013; Marsch, Yu, Schechter, & Blair, 2009). If this connection would account 
for our findings, a similar experiment using a feminine stimulus should result in an opposite pattern. 
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As long as the above considerations remain unanswered, our best interpretation of the results is that the 
ecological importance of biological motion stimuli creates a positive distortion in its perceived size.  
 
Study II: Veto, P., Schütz, I., & Einhäuser, W. (in press). Continuous flash suppression: Manual 
action affects eye movements but not the reported percept. Journal of Vision 
 
Rationale – Study II 
So far we have seen that the ecological importance of an action can change the way the action is 
perceived. Perception, however, is also influenced by the own actions of the perceiver, particularly 
when those actions are related to an observed motion. Such effects have been demonstrated with 
actions that precede a visual task (off-line effects, see Schütz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007), or with 
concurrent actions (on-line effects). Studies of this latter group have indicated that performed action 
and observed movement need to share some attributes, or else perception would not be biased by 
performing an action at the same time. For example, studies found effects of manual rotation on mental 
rotation only when the two happened along an axis of the same orientation (Wohlschläger & 
Wohlschläger, 1998), or occurred in the same direction (Wexler et al., 1998). Perception of external 
events (instead of an imaginary visual task) also led to similar findings (see Wohlschläger, 2000; Beets 
et al., 2010; Keetels & Stekelenburg, 2014). To our knowledge though, no study so far has measured 
the effect of the type or degree of coupling between action and perception on the action-to-perception 
transfer. For example, experiments using ambiguous stimuli have either coupled the movement 
dynamics of a stimulus to test participants’ own movements (e.g. Mitsumatsu, 2009), or required that 
participants report on their percept by means of a motor task (as, among others, in the experiment of 
Beets and colleagues, 2010), where the dynamics of the response was independent of stimulus 
dynamics. Since synchronicity seems crucial in our perceptual understanding of the relationships 
between different events in the external world as well as between our own actions and their causes or 
consequences (e.g. Aschersleben & Prinz, 1995; Stephen, Stepp, Dixon, & Turvey, 2008), we created a 
paradigm where an on-line action-to-perception transfer is to be expected, and varied the degree of 
coupling between action and stimulus movement. Using an ambiguous stimulus and testing whether the 
action-to-perception transfer depends on the dynamic relationship between modalities is only possible 
if the action can be connected to one perceptual interpretation of the stimulus independent of the other, 
competing, percept. For example, applying two distinct gratings with opposite motion directions in a 
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classic binocular-rivalry paradigm would be problematic, as coupling an action to the motion of one 
grating would likely be interpreted as a coupling to the other. 
 
Paradigm – Study II 
To this end, we used a continuous flash suppression paradigm, where a drifting grating stimulus was 
presented to one eye and a salient Mondrian suppressor to the other. In this setup, the inter-ocular 
conflict is highly biased due to the low-level saliency of the continuously changing suppressor (novel 
images presented at 10 Hz), and the target stimulus can only be perceived when endogenous attention 
is deployed. Test participants pressed and held a button every time the target (grating) stimulus gained 
perceptual dominance, while in three conditions they (i) rotated a manipulandum device that governed 
the motion dynamics of the grating in a direct manner (coupled action condition), (ii) performed the 
same action, while the grating was only loosely coupled to their hand movement (decoupled action 
condition), or (iii) performed no action, while the grating’s translation followed a similar dynamics as 
in the other conditions (no action condition). 
Aside from participants’ subjective self-report, we also measured their eye-movements: a horizontally 
translating grating elicits an optokinetic nystagmus (OKN) response with varying relation to the 
stimulus velocity (gain). Although the OKN is a motor response per se, these eye-movements only 
appear when the grating is visible; under complete suppression, eye-movement behavior is dominated 
by fixations and their connecting saccades. This way, we gained both a subjective and an objective 
measure of participants’ perception of the target stimulus. Our hypothesis was that due to the action-to-
perception transfer, the overall perceived strength of the grating stimulus would increase when manual 
action is performed as opposed to when no action is required. This would be expressed in an increase in 
the total duration of participants’ button presses as well as in an increase in the overall OKN gain. As 
for the effects of the degree of coupling between action and stimulus, the relationship between the 
decoupled action condition and the other two conditions would show, whether (a) the degree of 
coupling has an absolute importance where only directly coupled action leads to a significant transfer 
effect, (b) the degree of coupling has no effect and the transfer effect can be equally observed with 
either coupled or decoupled action, or (c) the degree of coupling has a gradual effect on the action-to-
perception transfer, and the increase in perceptual strength in the decoupled action condition is between 
that of the coupled action and no action conditions. 
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Figure 4. Stimuli, Study II. Stimulus display. The dashed line was added to indicate the separation 
between the two eyes’ stimuli. 
 
Results – Study II 
We found no effect of action on the reported perception of the grating, while eye-movements revealed 
a significant effect, with a linear correspondence to the degree of coupling between action and stimulus 
dynamics. The implications of these findings are manifold. 
First, there is a clear conflict between the numerous earlier studies to show an action-to-perception 
transfer (as measured by the reported percept) in highly similar tasks and the lack of such an effect in 
our study. This difference is problematic to dismiss by assuming a lack of power in our case. First, 
button-press results do not show any marginal difference between conditions – that case could have 
pointed to the expected pattern simply lacking statistical significance. Second, in a comparable 
paradigm, our study tested 24 participants while in the experiments of Wohlschläger (2000; N = 5), 
Maruya, Yang, and Blake (2007; N = 5) or Beets and colleagues (2010; N = 11) smaller sample sizes 
yielded a clear effect. Third, the eye-movement measurements of our study revealed a significant 
difference. These reasons together make it highly unlikely that the lack of an action-to-perception 
transfer in the conscious percept in this experiment was an accidental result. Instead, the resolution 
might be found in the – so far largely unexplored – differences in how our paradigm affects selective 
attention as opposed to all earlier studies. Selective attentional control is weaker in binocular rivalry 
than in the perception of ambiguous figures (Meng & Tong, 2006) and while continuous flash 
suppression is a case of interocular competition too, it also shows differences that go beyond being 
merely a stronger case of biased binocular rivalry (see Tsuchiya, Koch, Gilroy, & Blake, 2006). 
Although our experiment does not directly test such differences and thus, any detailed conclusion in 
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this regard would be unsubstantiated, our findings on the action-to-perception transfer show that the 
conscious percept is affected differently in continuous flash suppression than in the rivalry paradigms 
used in earlier studies. 
Second, the separation between effects on the conscious percept and on eye-movements alludes to a 
dissociation between how higher and lower levels of processing are affected by the action-to-
perception transfer. This could either mean that different mechanisms are behind the two effects or that 
the same mechanism is affected at different sensitivities. 
Finally, if the reason behind the action-to-perception transfer is the existence of shared representations 
between the motor and perceptual domains (Prinz, 1997), then the dissociation in our results can be 
interpreted as a consequence of the existence of several such representations on different levels. 
 
Study III: Veto, P., Uhlig, M., Troje, N. F., & Einhäuser, W. (submitted manuscript). What you see is 
what you expect: Cognitive assumptions influence the action-to-perception transfer in ambiguous 
perception. 
 
Rationale – Study III 
In everyday life, we often use tools without much thought about how they actually work in order to 
achieve the goal we use them for. Initially though, some kind of understanding has to take place to 
allow expectations to form. One way for this to happen is through trial-and-error exploration of the 
input and output of the device (e.g., “which of the two entangled cords do I have to pull to close the 
window blinds?”). 
Alternatively, knowledge of the coupling between input and output can also come through learning 
about the internal workings of the tool. This is most prominent when the connection is not self-
explanatory at first sight. While understanding the steering mechanics of a bicycle seems obvious to 
most adults, the controls of an airplane may take some learning to master. The handlebars of the 
bicycle and the rudder pedals of the (most simplistic) airplane work in similar ways, but the coupling 
between the operator’s input and the outcome is reversed. In case of the airplane, the reverse coupling 
might be easier to grasp when the connecting wire between the pedals and the ipsilateral side of the 
rudder is kept in mind (Figure 5). With many other common tools too, the connection between action 
and its outcome is arbitrary, e.g. in how the spatial configuration of a rack and pinion defines which 
directional translation a given rotation is mapped to. 
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Figure 5. Illustration of simple mechanical systems. Although the coupling is arbitrary and can 
change from one system to the other, we are able to learn them at a level where finding the right 
direction already at the first movement does not require cognitive effort. However, the learning can be 
facilitated by knowledge of the mechanic layout. 
 
As we have seen earlier, many experimental findings demonstrated that action can affect perception 
and such effects take place with higher likelihood when the perceived motion is related to the action. In 
examples like that of the previous paragraph, action and its perceived outcome are obviously coupled, 
but their mappings are complex, at times even conflicting. So what do we rely on, when we use tools 
correctly, based on decisive predictions? If the shared representations between action and perception 
are on a low level, where top-down effects have no influence, then these predictions must come from 
straightforward contingencies. Indeed, results from Maruya and colleagues (2007) suggest that a direct 
information flow between the modalities is possible, as they found an action-to-perception transfer 
effect even when the action-coupled stimulus was outside of awareness. Similarly, Study II 
demonstrated that in a situation where the conscious percept was unaffected by coupled action, eye-
movements still displayed an effect. Other studies, like those of Wohlschläger (2000) or Beets and 
colleagues (2010), point in the opposite direction and suggest that the transfer should only take place 
when stimulus and action share a cognitively defined dimension, thus requiring cognitive mediation. In 
the present study, we aim to dissolve this contradiction by a paradigm that tests participants’ cognitive 
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model of action-perception coupling without biasing the immediate contingency between stimulus and 
performed action.  
 
Paradigm – Study III 
The internal model of coupling was induced by a rendered depiction of a 3 dimensional rotating 
cylinder, connected to a circulating lever (that resembled the manipulandum handle used by 
participants in the subsequent perceptual task). The connection was either through a belt-drive 
mechanism (“belt” condition; the rotation direction of cylinder and lever were the same) or through 
cogwheels (“gear” condition; opposite rotation directions). After participants had studied the 
mechanical model of the assigned condition, they completed four test-blocks with an ambiguous 
version of the cylinder (Figure 6b). Their task was to report their percept of the cylinder, by rotating the 
manipulandum lever in the same or opposite direction (orders counterbalanced) as the lever of the 
mechanical model would rotate (red bar of Figure 6a). This way, the match between stimulus and 
action direction was either congruent (same direction instruction in the belt and opposite direction 
instruction in the gear condition) or incongruent (opposite direction instruction in the belt and same 
direction instruction in the gear condition) with the perceived cylinder rotation (Figure 6d). The same 
procedure was then repeated with the other mechanical model (order counterbalanced between 
participants; for details, see Table 2 in the article). Perceptual stability was assessed based on the 
lengths of intervals when the reported direction remained unchanged. 
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Figure 6. Stimuli, percept, and task, Study III. a) First, in separate blocks (blocks 1 & 6, see table 
2), participants were introduced to the mechanical model (“belt” or “gear” layout). For 30 seconds, they 
controlled the displayed motion with the manipulandum. Then, 20 seconds of unambiguous motion 
followed (the cylinder and mechanical model rotated with occasional switches in direction), where 
observers had to report the rotation of the red handle in accordance with the subsequent experimental 
block (“same direction instruction” or “opposite direction instruction”). For the last 20 seconds of 
training, the red handle bar disappeared and the mechanics was covered by a virtual desk, while the 
task remained unchanged. b) All test blocks showed the same, ambiguous, motion cylinder for 3 
minutes each. c) Two possible perceptual interpretations of the test stimulus (clockwise and counter-
clockwise). Participants had to respond to the imagined motion of the red lever, as it related to their 
current percept. d) Instruction (manipulandum rotation in the same or opposite direction as that of the 
red lever in the mental model). Note that in the “belt” condition, the same/opposite direction instruction 
leads to congruency/incongruency between perceived and performed rotation, while this relationship is 
reversed in the “gear” condition. 
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If the action-to-perception transfer is dominated by perception (direct information flow between 
domains), then regardless of the induced internal model, the effect of match between perceived 
stimulus direction and performed action will lead to the same congruency effect as found by Beets and 
colleagues (2010). However, if cognition plays a major role in how the transfer is formed, results from 
the two models should diverge: the increase in perceptual stability in congruent directions should 
reflect the instruction on the mechanical model’s lever and not the actually perceived direction. This 
would lead to a reversed pattern in the gear condition and an interaction between factors internal model 
and match in our design (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Hypotheses, Study III. Expected effects of internal model and match (between percept and 
action) on perceptual stability, if action-perception coupling is not under cognitive influence (left) or 
dominated by the cognitive model (right). 
 
Results – Study III 
A significant interaction between the two factors showed an influence of the cognitive model of 
coupling on the action-to-perception transfer. The reversal of the congruency effect was not complete 
however: the match between perceived direction and performed action only showed a significant 
difference between congruent and incongruent directions in the belt, but not in the gear condition 
(Figure 8). These results together indicate that while cognition significantly influences the action-to-
perception transfer, it is not the sole source of the effect. The lack of a significant effect in the gear 
condition alludes to a cancellation of the natural action-perception congruency effect by an equally 
large influence of the assumed mechanical model. 
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In line with the conflicting results in the literature and with the findings of Study II, we conclude that 
the observed action-to-perception transfer phenomenon cannot be explained by a model that assumes a 
single source of the effect. Study III also shows that when using simple tools, we do not only rely on 
direct sensorimotor contingencies, but may also incorporate internal assumptions that exert top-down 
influence on our perceptual expectations. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Results, Study III. Perceptual stability for each condition, averaged across participants. 
Error bars show standard errors of the mean. 
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Practical outlook II – perceptual expectations in real life 
It appears so that using tools relies on learned contingencies between action and its outcome, as 
well as on an internal model. These two sources can interfere positively or negatively and in 
case of a positive interference, a stronger expectation is formed. Using a simple tool involves 
such expectations, where repeated practice leads to a solid internal model, which in turn 
increases efficiency by freeing up resources. For example, a child learning to use a screw driver 
might initially have to use trial-and-error to find the correct direction, until the mechanism is 
learned. 
The skill of driving a car is mastered similarly, where up to the 1990s, practically all processes 
were highly predictable under normal circumstances. Since then, more and more controls are 
taking effect through a computerized mediation, leading to less predictability between action 
and perceivable outcome. Although the computer itself may be highly predictable, the user who 
does not understand its workings would not be able to anticipate its reactions. The most simple 
example is how a hybrid powertrain reacts to a given amount of accelerator input differently 
depending on the state of the system, e.g. whether the internal combustion engine is currently on 
or off. With the increase of computerization from traction control through driver assistance 
systems to conditional automation, the uneducated driver is facing increasing unpredictability. 
While initial stages of this trend might only keep enthusiastic drivers away and do not affect 
safety negatively in those who adapt to the new systems, later stages have revealed two sources 
of issues, both of which can be traced back to our logic regarding sensorimotor contingencies. 
First, drivers experiencing a decrease or complete loss in coupling between their actions and the 
actions’ effects might lose trust in the machine (Abraham et al., 2017) and end up not using 
these systems (Kidd, Cicchino, Reagan, & Kerfoot, 2017). Second, and probably more 
importantly, the lack of connection can lead to a decrease in attention and a drastic drop of 
involvement (Geitner et al., 2017; Reimer et al., 2016), where unreasonable trust is given to a 
personified machine (Inagaki & Itoh, 2013; Waytz, Heafner, & Epley, 2014). Study III suggests 
that increasing the knowledge about how the machine operates (building the “internal model of 
coupling”) could help with these issues, which is in line with the findings of studies in the 
applied field (Sonoda & Wada, 2017; Thill, Hemeren, & Nilsson, 2014). 
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5. General discussion 
Study I answers a simple question, which, to my knowledge, has not been asked before. Regardless of 
whether the reason behind our remarkable sensitivity to perceiving the movements of animate entities 
is purely perceptual in nature or comes from the internalized effects of motor practice in the perceiver, 
our widely demonstrated skills in biological motion perception allude to a high ecological importance 
of its visual cues. As studies with other types of stimuli have shown, important objects tend to look 
larger to the observer, and now we have evidence that biological motion displays are no exception. 
Although in the introduction, I argued for the view of considering action-influence as a significant 
factor in the forming of the preferential processing of biological motion, the line of thought as well as 
the empirical evidence presented there only attempt to explain the perceptual abilities around the 
recognition and identification of animate entities. The reason behind the size-distortion effect remains 
just as mysterious as in the earlier studies using different stimuli. Arguments can be made for a 
relationship with an internal representational space, as in the “SNARC” effect and its relation to the 
vertical dimension (Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 1993; Ito & Hatta, 2004), but this connection seems 
more or less plausible only for social stimuli that operate with power and vertical hierarchy. If a similar 
affinity in the use of a male walker and predominantly female observers in Study I is a contributor to 
the results, then the argument might also apply to the case of biological motion perception. Having no 
other speculative alternative, we can assume that with some likelihood, the explanation may lie in that 
all evaluations of subjective importance are organized in a mental space that interacts with the 
representation of physical space. 
Studies II and III test the properties of the on-line action-to-perception transfer. The theories of 
common coding (Prinz, 1997) and event coding (Hommel et al., 2001) suggest that the effect takes 
place on higher levels of processing and involves only the general properties of an event, while the 
details are coded distally and do not interact between domains. While results of many studies support 
these ideas, some raise questions about the level of processing where the transfer might take place and 
about the more or less cognitive nature of the transfer (see Sections 2 & 3). The original aim of Study II 
was to assess the contribution of the degree of coupling between action and perception on the action-to-
perception transfer. To achieve this, we implemented our conditions of variable coupling in a 
continuous flash suppression paradigm that has not been used in a similar context so far. This choice 
was primarily due to the practical considerations of connecting movement to only one state of a 
bistable percept. Incidentally however, it also led to further and unexpected findings. First, seeing a 
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gradual effect of the degree of coupling on the OKN gain suggests that in our paradigm, the action-to-
perception transfer did not only include the general presence and direction of rotation, but also the 
details of its dynamics. Second, and yet more contrary to the predictions of the common coding 
principle, we found no effects on the experiment’s higher-level measure of percept (the conscious self-
report), possibly due to the selective attentional involvement in the CFS paradigm. This alone would 
talk more to the nature of CFS than support or reject the common coding model; however, 
simultaneously finding significant effects in a lower-level measure means that the assumptions about 
the hierarchical nature of the transfer may need revisiting. In line with the findings of Maruya and 
colleagues (2007), our results also show that a transfer effect outside of awareness seems possible and 
that top-down control is not necessary. 
Wohlschläger (2000) argues, also based on experimental evidence, for “action capture”, where a low-
level, direct, information flow is unlikely to account for the effects. Results of Study III are partly in 
support of his views, as they demonstrate that a cognitive model of the effects of action can change the 
perceptual bias of action, even with a constant visual stimulus and no explicit exposure to the 
sensorimotor contingency that could explain the results on a lower level. However, the pattern was not 
completely reversed by the internal model in Study III, showing that the lower-level coupling between 
concurrent action and perception can also have an effect through a separate mechanism. This, taken 
together with the findings of Study II, paints a picture that is less in favor of the original arguments of 
Wohlschläger (2000). 
It seems as if the more data we have, the tougher it becomes to locate the action-to-perception transfer 
in processing hierarchy. With each new paradigm, the question is asked slightly differently and the 
answers keep pushing the boundaries of the common coding theory as they were originally described. 
One possible resolution is to assume that several levels of processing can create connections between 
action and perception and the model should be flexible in this regard. The common coding theory, in its 
original form, cannot account for all the experimental evidence that has gathered in the two decades 
since its creation. Modifying it by positing that the shared representations do not necessarily have to be 
at the proximal end of the two processing streams but could occur on many levels (even 
independently), would give the ability of explaining the otherwise contradicting results of this thesis as 
well as of earlier studies. This also fits the general trend in cognitive science from rigid models to more 
flexible ones. On the other hand, it would create the necessity of a host of “new” representations, 
possibly one for each new way of testing – and if that was indeed the case, it would challenge the very 
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purpose of modeling. Furthermore, such a liberation of the common coding theory would evidently 
bring up a question, which has in fact been lingering around since the earliest days of the model. While 
the original question was along the lines of “on what level does the transfer take place?”, now we 
should ask “what is the lowest level, where the transfer might occur?” 
So far, I have considered all theoretical questions of this text in a representational framework. Beyond 
being the most common in today’s psychological approaches, this viewpoint seems to formulate the 
questions of my experiments well. However, discarding the assumption that any experience is based on 
an internal representation could eliminate the issues detailed above (and possibly raise other ones). 
While the related debates around the existence or nonexistence of a “Cartesian theater” reach far back 
in the history of philosophy, when it comes to psychology, the non-representational viewpoint is often 
traced back to William James (1912). Oddly enough, the representational framework also finds a 
starting point in his writings (James, 1890), at least for psychologists. One may get a clearer and more 
contemporary picture of what this direction of thought entails from the writings of Gibson (2015), 
where he argues that perception is the starting point that we need to understand first, keeping in mind 
that organisms are mobile and perception operates in service of action. In this functional account of 
perception the two domains are not even really separate from each other, and the perception of 
invariant structures (objects) requires motion through time. Due to this, taking the retinal image at a 
given time point as the basis of visual perception is incorrect and misses the most important, dynamic 
and relational, pieces of information about the environment. Furthermore, if this information is in the 
interaction with the environment, there is no need for complex internal computations to model the 
world from an impoverished input. This way, all my earlier contemplations in this script about how our 
participants’ subjective percepts are biased are misguided, as the individual’s percept is not subjective 
but simply relational to his or her self, and these relations are not inferred but perceived directly. If, for 
example, the stimulus resembles a person, the relationship (or “affordance”) will be very different than 
in the case of meaningless dots. 
This view aims to completely get rid of the issues with representations by positing that perception is an 
interactive process where the external world is used as its own representation, through constant 
interaction with it. This may as well have interesting connections to some puzzling findings, described 
in “Practical outlook I – representation of gravity” (p 8). Gravity is by far the most constant invariant in 
our daily experience, so we can always use it accurately in real-world tasks: in any ballistic movement 
we can detect the cues of gravity and use them for accurate predictions. However, in imagery, these 
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initial cues are missing and the imagined outcomes will be highly unrealistic. Would this also mean 
though that everything else (which we can imagine well) has internal representations – suggesting a 
hybrid model that is not radical in either direction (see below; O’Regan & Noë, 2001)? 
While leaving open a lot of questions as for how direct perception actually happens, there are many 
practical implications of this model, which might be the reason for the current rise in popularity of 
similar ideas where actions is inseparable from perception and cognition (Engel, Maye, Kurthen, & 
König, 2013). 
Note also a common confusion of terms, due to them being vaguely defined. In psychology, we often 
contrast behavioral and neural measures, which serves practical purposes when describing methods. 
But in essence, what is not a behavior? In biology, the term is more clearly defined: on the level of a 
retinal receptor cell, for example, activities induced by light are the cell’s behavior. The lowest possible 
levels of sensation are also behavioral. 
Using a somewhat similar (albeit far wider reaching) logic, O’Regan and Noë (2001) propose a 
framework where “seeing is a way of acting”. The crucial term in their theory is sensorimotor 
contingency: instead of representations based on sensation, they claim that all experience comes from 
an exploratory activity, where sensorimotor contingencies contain the knowledge that mediates in this 
exploration. The argument is that from the perspective of the brain, there is no difference from neural 
input from one source or another. All differentiation comes from previous experience of the structure of 
how motor actions induced (or rather, co-occurred with) changes in the given sensory input; in other 
words, from the sensorimotor contingency. 
This view offers remarkable flexibility. For example, no complicated mechanism is needed to explain 
the differences between senses. The physical relationship between action and sensory input is itself 
very different between the modalities, and the same mechanism that extracts these contingencies would 
uncover the regular relationships (or “laws”, as the authors call them) in both cases, despite the 
differences. In this framework, the interaction between action and perception happens on all levels at 
all times and do not require common coding or representations of any sort – seemingly solving the 
issues that we considered previously. Results of Study III show effects of cognition without any direct 
sensorimotor coupling behind – so how would these results fit the model? According to the authors, the 
knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies can extend to arbitrary levels of abstraction. This does not 
mean that there is an actual, pictorial, model somewhere in the mind, or following the authors’ example 
“… as though, in order to generate letters on one’s screen, the computer had to have little letters 
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floating around in its electronics somewhere” (O’Regan & Noë, 2001). Instead, it means that the 
possible effects of manipulations are considered based on the extraction of “laws” (not necessarily the 
direct effect itself) from previous experience. This theory somehow bridges the nonrepresentational and 
representational frameworks at this point. Conceivably the most authentic definition of radical 
empiricism is in James’ Essays in Radical Empiricism (1912): “To be radical, an empiricism must 
neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them 
any element that is directly experienced.” Taking this definition as a starting point, one might argue 
both for and against the inclusion of sensorimotor contingencies – or even more ambiguously, of the 
knowledge of them – into the category of directly experienced elements, based on the detailed 
interpretations of these terms. 
Ultimately, these questions have crucial importance, as they deliver the most pervasive impact on our 
personal ‘theories of everything’. For the empirical psychologist however, this level of philosophical 
abstraction might seem as a mere collection of terminologies. To this end, I would like to simply close 
my thesis by listing the least insecure conclusions from our experiments: 
1. Perception is a flexible process, allowing for effects of action in a multitude of manners. 
2. Ecologically valid biological motion displays are perceived as larger than similar displays that 
depict ecologically implausible motion cues. 
3. On-line effects of action on ambiguous perception are not restricted to a certain level of 
processing: cognitive effects as well as direct, low-level, connections can both be observed. 
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Abstract 
Visual illusions explore the limits of sensory processing and provide an ideal testbed to study 
perception. Size illusions – stimuli whose size is consistently misperceived – do not only result from 
sensory cues, but can also be induced by cognitive factors, such as social status. Here we investigate, 
whether the ecological relevance of biological motion can also distort perceived size. We asked 
observers to judge the size of point-light walkers (PLWs), configurations of dots whose movements 
induce the perception of human movement, and visually matched control stimuli (inverted PLWs). We 
find that upright PLWs are consistently judged as larger than inverted PLWs, while static point-light 
figures did not elicit the same effect. We also show the phenomenon using an indirect paradigm: 
observers judged the relative size of a disc that followed an inverted PLW larger than a disc following 
an upright PLW. We interpret this as a contrast effect: The upright PLW is perceived larger and thus 
the subsequent disc is judged smaller. Together, these results demonstrate that ecologically relevant 
biological-motion stimuli are perceived larger than visually matched control stimuli. Our findings 
present a novel case of illusory size perception, where ecological importance leads to a distorted 
perception of size.  
Part II. – Appendix: Study I.   
 
42 
Introduction 
Systematic distortions in the perception of size can be observed in a wide variety of visual scenarios. 
Two mechanisms underlie most of the classic examples. One of them is size constancy, where an object 
that appears farther from the viewer seems to be larger as opposed to a nearer object, even though they 
create an equally large retinal image in the viewer. The other mechanism is size contrast, where the 
apparent size of an object changes inversely with the size of other, related, objects. This can take place 
simultaneously (e.g., a circle among circles in the Ebbinghaus/Titchener illusion), or with a temporal 
delay (size adaptation aftereffect1). Illusions exploiting these mechanisms affect not only the 
“conscious” percept as reported by the viewer, but also the size of afterimages2 or objective measures, 
such as reaction times3-4. 
While the aforementioned size illusions are perceptual in nature, a different class of size illusions 
pertains to social constructs that can also lead to a change in perceived size of a person or an inanimate 
object. A general association between positive subjective value and larger size exists5, and this 
reciprocal connection has been observed in different areas of life. The most palpable example for such 
a relation is between social leadership and physical size6, where it is conspicuous that mechanisms 
described by evolutionary psychology still play a role in today’s society7. Tall men are more likely to 
take managerial positions than short men8, while people with more social power perceive other 
humans9 and objects10 as smaller, as well as they are perceived as taller by others11 and by 
themselves10. A size-status connection also prevails in the case of consumer products12. Aside from 
power, motivation and action goals13 and aesthetic preference judgments14 are likewise related to the 
size of non-animate objects. Altogether, these findings suggest that there is a general, positive, 
association between the importance or value of an object to the viewer and its perceived size. 
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Animate motion patterns are rapidly perceivable15,16,17, visually salient18 and carry numerous types of 
information that are readily retrievable by human observers19,20,21. The perception of biological motion 
is arguably of high ecological importance, making preferential processing by the visual system for such 
stimuli likely, even though direct evidence is scarce. The most commonly used tool to explore this 
question is point-light figures. They eliminate all visual information obtainable from the surface of the 
body by only showing the movements of a few important articulations depicted as dots. With the help 
of point-light stimuli, biological motion has been shown to yield to several perceptual benefits as 
compared to similar non-biological motion. For example, coherent and upright point-light walkers 
(PLWs) are processed incidentally in a flanker paradigm, as opposed to static, scrambled22 or inverted23 
walkers. Upright, scrambled biological motion stimuli lead to faster hits in a search task than similar, 
but inverted figures24, which means that local cues of biological motion act on a preattentive level of 
visual processing. Upright human or terrestrial animal PLWs induce reflexive attentional orienting in a 
central cueing paradigm, while inverted or static figures do not25, showing that incidental effects are 
not specific to stimuli presenting configural information that is typical of humans. Indeed, local motion 
cues, in particular those of the feet, play a crucial role in a “life detector” system: a general filter in 
human vision, tuned to help us detect terrestrial animals26-28. 
Biological-motion stimuli, therefore, seem to be of special importance in visual processing. Also, 
important objects tend to look larger to the viewer. We thus hypothesize that stimuli carrying 
ecologically valid biological motion cues appear larger to observers, as compared to similar motion 
stimuli lacking ecological validity. We tested this hypothesis using human PLWs in three experiments, 
where we compared coherent, upright, PLW figures to inverted ones. In the inverted displays, both 
local and global biological motion cues lack ecological validity, while all other aspects of the stimulus 
remain equal to those in the upright figures. Hence, seeing a difference in perceived size between the 
two conditions can only be due to the effect of the ecological importance of biological motion. 
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Figure 1. Paradigm – Experiment I. Sequence of a single trial (here with upright PLW). 
 
Experiment I 
Perceived sizes of upright and inverted PLWs (see Figure 1) were compared directly in an adjustment 
task. 
Methods 
Participants. Sixteen students from the Queen’s University participant pool (one male, fifteen females, 
mean age = 20.1, SD = 1.8) participated in the study. Experimental protocols of all experiments 
conformed to the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki and were approved by the board 
“Ethikkommission FB04, Philipps-University Marburg” and by the Human Ethics committee at 
Queen’s. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, provided written informed consent 
and received monetary compensation. One participant dropped out after reporting problems with larger 
stimulus sizes. 
Stimuli. Upright and inverted PLWs were depicted from a frontal view, based on the action “Walk” 
from a stimulus set of human actions created by Vanrie and Verfaillie29, based on the actions of a male 
actor. The figure consisted of 13 dots, showing the positions of the head and the main articulations of 
the limbs (Figure 1). Walker size was varied in 10 steps between 2.44˚ x 0.88˚ and 7.86˚ x 2.70˚ (mean: 
point-light walker
250 ms
random dot mask 
200 ms
adjustment task 
(width & height)
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5.24˚ x 1.77˚) at a viewing distance of 75 cm. Each PLW presentation started at a random frame of the 
stride, resulting in slightly varying sizes for each trial. All displays were gray on black background, 
with a red fixation point continuously shown in the center of the screen. Stimuli were presented on a 
17” CRT screen with Matlab and the Psychophysics Toolbox30,31. 
Procedure. For each trial, participants were asked to maintain fixation on the fixation point and viewed 
a centrally displayed PLW for 250 ms, followed by a dynamic random dot mask, lasting for 200 ms. 
After the mask, participants had to move the mouse in order to adjust a rectangle to frame the area 
occupied by the previously seen walker as tightly as possible (Figure 1). The mouse position was 
connected to a corner of the rectangle, starting randomly either from the fixation point, or from well 
outside of the stimulus’ area. The rectangle stayed centrally symmetrical at all times. That way, the 
width and height of the walker were set independently, albeit in a single response. Participants 
confirmed their responses by a mouse click, after which the next trial started following a random 
intertrial interval between 500 and 800 ms. Each participant completed 400 trials. 
Analysis. For each trial, the percentage of overestimation (area of the response rectangle divided by the 
area of the smallest frame containing all dots at any time) was calculated. Outlier responses (cutoff = 
2.5 SD) were removed for each block (2.2% of all trials). A one sample t-test was carried out to 
determine whether the difference between responses to upright and inverted walkers (Distortion Effect 
= OverestimationUpright Walker – OverestimationInverted Walker) was significantly different from zero. 
Results 
The size distortion effect was significantly different from zero (expressed in percentage of walker area: 
mean = 9.07, SD = 5.73; t(14) = 6.12, p < 0.001). This confirms our hypothesis that upright walkers are 
perceived to be larger than inverted walkers. 
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Experiment II 
To control whether the observed size-distortion effect is specific to biological motion (rather than an 
upright/inverted difference per se), we conducted a second experiment similar to Experiment I, with the 
additional condition of static point-light figures. If the effect is caused by configural information alone 
instead of biological motion, static figures should elicit the same pattern of results as dynamic PLWs. 
Methods 
Participants. Twenty-four students from the Chemnitz University of Technology (five males, nineteen 
females, mean age = 21.9, SD = 3.2) participated in the study. 
Stimuli. Stimuli were presented on a 23.6” screen (VPixx Technologies Inc., Saint-Bruno, QC Canada), 
with all other details of the stimulus kept equal to those in Experiment I. In each trial of the additional 
static condition, a randomly selected frame of the PLW was presented for the same duration of time 
(250 ms) as the moving PLW in the dynamic condition. 
Procedure. Each participant completed a total of 640 trials split over four blocks. Two blocks 
contained dynamic PLWs while the other two contained static point-light figures. Static and dynamic 
trials were otherwise identical. The order of the four blocks was counterbalanced across observers. 
Results 
Dynamic blocks showed a replication of results from Experiment I, with a size distortion effect 
significantly different from zero (in percentage of walker area: mean = 7.34, SD = 15.19; t(23) = 2.37, 
p = 0.03). Static blocks on the other hand did not show a significant size-distortion effect (mean = 4.32, 
SD = 17.60; t(23) = 1.20, p = 0.24). 
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Figure 2. Paradigm – Experiment III. Sequence of a single trial (here with upright PLW in the lower 
position and inverted PLW in the upper position). 
 
Experiment III 
Perceived sizes of upright and inverted PLWs were compared indirectly, with a size judgment task on 
targets presented subsequently to PLWs. As upright PLWs are perceived as larger, we expect that 
contrast effects will lead to a subsequent target to appear as smaller. Since participants react to simple 
disc targets and they are instructed to ignore the preceding figures, this experiment further ensures that 
our previous findings are caused by a perceptual distortion of size and not by any unexplored bias 
related to PLWs. 
Methods 
Participants. Sixteen students (five males, eleven females, mean age = 22.1, SD = 1.9) participated in 
the study. Eight (1-8) were measured at Philipps-University Marburg and eight (9-16) at Queen’s 
University, and recruited through the respective participant pools. All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, provided written informed consent and received monetary compensation. 
Stimuli. Generation and presentation of stimuli were as described for Experiment I. PLWs (both 
walkers, in all conditions: 5.4˚ x 1.9˚) and target discs (diameters depending on condition: 0.76˚ & 
point-light walkers 
250 ms
inter-stimulus interval 
(17 or 100 ms)
size judgement task
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0.76˚; 0.72˚ & 0.80˚; 0.68˚ & 0.84˚) were presented centered 3.46˚ above and below fixation. All 
displays were gray on black background, and a fixation point was continuously shown in the center of 
the screen. 
Procedure. For each trial, participants were asked to maintain fixation on the fixation point while 
viewing two PLWs (one upright and the other inverted) for 250 ms. Participants were instructed to 
ignore these displays. Following a blank inter-stimulus interval (ISI) of 17 or 100 ms, two target discs 
appeared for 100 ms at the locations of the previously seen walkers (Figure 2). Targets were either 
identical or differed in size (10.5% or 21% larger or smaller than the average size of 0.76˚). Participants 
gave a non-speeded forced choice response by pressing one of two buttons, indicating which of the 
targets was larger than the other. After response, the next trial started following a random intertrial 
interval between 500 and 800 ms. 
Participants 1-8 also completed trials for a temporal judgment task in separate blocks, which are not 
reported here. For participants 1-4, no trials with identical targets were presented. For participants 5-8, 
eye tracking was used to validate that observers maintained fixation throughout stimulus presentation. 
Participants 1-4 each performed 400 trials, participants 5-8 each performed 480 trials and participants 
9-16 each performed 1000 trials in total. 
Analysis. For each participant, the point of subjective equality (PSE) between targets preceded by 
upright and inverted walkers was calculated. To do so, a psychometric function was fitted to the data of 
each individual (fraction of responses “larger” at upright PLW location vs. size difference of discs), 
and the PSE determined analytically from its two fit parameters (cf. Figure 3). A one-sample t-test was 
then used to determine whether PSEs were significantly different from zero. 
Results 
PSEs were shifted towards larger targets at the upright PLW’s location (mean = 2.60, SD = 2.96, in 
percentage of target size). This shift was different from zero (t(15) = 3.51, p = 0.003). There was no 
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difference between trials with long and short ISIs (meanShort ISI = 2.63, SDShort ISI = 3.26; meanLong ISI = 
2.68, SDLong ISI = 3.44; t(15) = 0.06, p = 0.95). This is in line with our hypothesis and shows that targets 
preceded by an upright walker are perceived as smaller than targets preceded by an inverted walker 
(Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Results – Experiment III. Percent of responses indicating that the target preceded by an 
upright walker was larger plotted against the difference between target (disc) sizes. Means per 
condition with fitted psychometric function. Error bars show s.e.m. Asterisks indicate significant 
difference of PSE at p < 0.01. Data for both ISIs (17 ms, 100 ms) were aggregated for analysis. 
The functional form of the psychometric function is given by f(x;a,l)=a/(a+exp(-l*x)), and thus the PSE 
by x=-ln[a]/l with fit parameters a and l. Note that the psychometric function for illustration is a fit to 
the average data, while for statistical analysis each individual was fitted with a separate psychometric 
function and analysis was based on the distribution of the individual PSEs. 
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Discussion 
The findings presented here show that stimuli with ecologically valid biological motion cues appear 
larger than similar motion stimuli without ecological validity. Experiment I demonstrates this 
phenomenon. Experiment II replicates the findings and shows that static point-light displays do not 
lead to a similar distortion in perceived size. Experiment III shows that the effect can also be measured 
indirectly, as it extends through a contrast mechanism to subsequently presented, neutral, stimuli. 
Prior studies have demonstrated that discrimination of biological motion stimuli takes place at an early 
stage of visual processing16,17 and induces reflexive attentional orienting25. This suggests that biological 
motion stimuli bear high importance, which is further supported by experiments demonstrating that 
humans32 and other animals33 have an innate sensitivity to visual invariants characteristic to biological 
motion. Our findings lead to similar conclusions, as already a brief presentation (250 ms) of biological 
motion results in a positive distortion of perceived size, which is linked to subjectively important 
stimuli5-14. 
Although a contrast effect seems the most likely mechanism transferring the distortion in perceived size 
from PLWs to the disc targets used in Experiment III, alternative causes are also possible. For example, 
spatial attention might be deployed asymmetrically between upright and inverted walkers, causing an 
inhibition of return34 on responses to subsequent target discs. This, however, would not explain the 
results found in Experiment I & II, where only one, central target is presented at a time. 
While PLWs are useful in eliminating surface information from the body, they thus also take biological 
motion cues out of their natural context. We cannot exclude that from the dots of a point-light figure 
the perceptual system might “fill in” the rest of the body. If that happens more likely for upright than 
for inverted figures, a larger percept would be formed for the former. However, Experiment II offers 
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some hint that this may not be the case in our experiments, as the human figure is also clearly 
recognizable from the frontal view of a static point-light display (cf. Figure 1). 
We cannot exclude that sex differences might also play some role in the results, considering that our 
participant population was dominantly females and it is conceivable that women are more responsive to 
biological motion and its social implications35. Studies on the link between social power and size6-11 
suggest that the sex as well as the displayed power of the stimulus figure can likewise affect the 
outcome. Studying sex differences of the reported effects might therefore be an interesting extension in 
further research. 
As it has been shown with other stimuli already, importance to the viewer makes objects look larger. 
Our data show that biological motion is no exception. It clearly demonstrates a so far unknown 
example of distorted size perception. Unlike previous examples, this phenomenon is neither a low-level 
effect1-4 nor based on social constructs5,7,9,10. Instead, our data suggest that the ecological relevance of a 
biological motion stimulus makes it incidentally appear larger. 
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Abstract 
Diverse paradigms, including ambiguous stimuli and mental imagery, have suggested a shared 
representation between motor and perceptual domains. We examined the effects of manual action on 
ambiguous perception in a continuous flash suppression (CFS) experiment. Specifically, we asked 
participants to try and perceive a suppressed grating, while rotating a manipulandum. In one condition, 
the grating’s motion was fully controlled by the manipulandum movement, in another condition the 
coupling was weak, and in a third condition no movement was executed. We found no effect of the 
movement condition on the subjectively reported visibility of the grating, which is in contrast to 
previous studies that allowed for more top-down influence. However, we did observe an effect on eye 
movements: the gain of the optokinetic nystagmus induced by the grating was modulated by its 
coupling to the manual movement. Our results (i) indicate that action-to-perception transfer can occur 
on different levels of perceptual organization, (ii) support the notion that CFS operates qualitatively 
differently from other ambiguous stimuli, including binocular rivalry, and (iii) highlight the importance 
of objective measures beyond subjective report when studying how action affects perception and 
awareness. 
 
Keywords: event-coding, common coding theory, continuous flash suppression, action-perception 
coupling, action-to-perception transfer, eye-movement, optokinetic nystagmus, ambiguous perception, 
bistable perception, rivalry, binocular rivalry  
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Introduction 
Perception obviously affects action, but there is also mounting evidence for the reverse direction, a 
direct effect of action on perception and perceptual representations. In an effort of determining the 
underlying mechanisms, the common coding theory (Prinz, 1997) suggests that late stages of 
perception and early stages of action use shared representations, which then allow action planning to be 
promptly influenced by a connected percept. Furthermore, while an external influence of action on 
perception is trivial (by moving our eyes, changing location or manipulating the world around us; see 
e.g., Wexler & van Boxtel, 2005), the common coding theory, as well as the theory of event-coding 
(e.g. Müsseler, 1999), also implies an internal influence of action on perception. If the observation of 
an action creates motor resonance, the production of an action should lead to a similar, but perceptual, 
resonance (Schütz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007). There is some experimental evidence to support this 
notion. Wohlschläger and Wohlschläger (1998) found that concurrent manual rotation led to faster 
performance in a mental rotation task when the directions of action and mental rotation were congruent 
as opposed to when they were incongruent. This, however, was only observed when the two rotations 
occurred about the same axis. Similarly, Wexler, Kosslyn and Berthoz (1998) showed that speed as 
well as accuracy in an imagery mental rotation task can be enhanced by unseen motor rotation, in a 
direction that is congruent with the action. In line with Wohlschläger and Wohlschläger (1998), they 
also found that the facilitating effect of congruent action is dependent on the relative angle and velocity 
of the movements. 
Further evidence for an internal effect of action on perception is provided by paradigms in which action 
leads to a bias in the percept of an external stimulus, instead of the outcome of imagery (for an 
overview of different methods, see Zwickel & Prinz, 2012). Multistable stimuli are ideal tools for 
making internal biases measurable, while the external stimulation stays unchanged. This can be 
achieved through an inherent ambiguity, where the stimulus itself has two or more stable 
interpretations (ambiguous stimuli such as – for example – the Necker cube (Necker, 1832) or Boring’s 
old/young figure (Boring, 1930)), or through the presentation of different stimuli in one eye as opposed 
to the other, leading to a conflict that is resolved by either one or the other eye gaining dominance at a 
time (binocular rivalry, BR, Wheatstone, 1838). 
Using an ambiguous rotating display, Wohlschläger (2000) primed the perceived direction of motion 
by both hand movements and planned actions, and found that either one can be sufficient for biasing 
the percept, if they share a common, cognitively specified dimension with the stimulus. In the case of 
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planned actions, there is no kinesthetic information to bias the visual modality. He argues that this 
makes a direct, low level, motor-to-visual information flow an implausible explanation for why the 
priming – or “action capture” – took place. Instead, he suggests that the phenomenon is more similar to 
attentional capture, where top-down control plays a crucial role, and where effects are object- and 
action-centered. 
For an ambiguous structure-from-motion cylinder, Beets and colleagues (2010) demonstrated that 
rotating a manipulandum congruently with the current percept stabilizes its perceptual state, while an 
opposing rotation yields destabilization. In line with Wohlschläger’s reasoning for the top-down nature 
of action capture, these effects were only observed when the manipulandum was used to report the 
percept, while no effect of action was found when concurrent rotation of the manipulandum was 
unrelated to the task. 
Instead of ambiguous displays, Keetels and Stekelenburg (2014) used an unambiguous stimulus with 
high perceptual uncertainty. With a flashing bar stimulus that was displaced only slightly (or remained 
stationary) at each trial, they found that concurrent, directional, button press actions shifted the point of 
subjective equality of perceptual displacement judgments in the direction of action. 
While both Wohlschläger (2000) and Beets et al. (2010) used ambiguous displays, similar effects were 
also found in BR (Maruya, Yang, & Blake, 2007), where perception of the movement of one eye’s 
stimulus was positively biased by manual control. Interestingly, the effect of action did not only occur 
when the coupled stimulus was dominant, but also when it was suppressed from awareness (i.e., when 
the stimulus of the other eye had exclusive dominance). This argues against an explanation that is 
solely based on top-down control. 
Imitated hand action can also bias perception in BR. Di Pace and Saracini (2014) used a dynamic hand 
action presented in one eye and a checkerboard pattern in the other, and found that dominance 
durations for perceiving the hand action were longer, when the same action was imitated by the 
observer. 
In a stream-bounce display (Metzger, 1934), two identical objects move towards each other until 
reaching a common position, after which they move away from each other following a continuous path. 
The perceptual interpretation of this animation is ambiguous, as the objects may seem to either pass 
through or bounce off of one another. When the motion of the disks is controlled by the hand action of 
the observer, the visual interpretation that is congruent with the performed action is more likely to take 
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place, as shown by Mitsumatsu (2009). Similarly to Beets and colleagues (2010), he also found that the 
mere presence of action is not sufficient for the effect to occur. 
Perceptual resonance may happen simultaneously (on-line effects), or through  motor learning on 
different time scales (off-line effects; Schütz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007). To our knowledge, only a few 
studies on the on-line effects of action on perception so far have used action as a way of controlling 
concurrent stimulus dynamics, and they only used action as either coupled or not coupled to the 
stimulus. To test whether the action-perception transfer is influenced by the degree of coupling 
between task-relevant hand movement and stimulus velocity dynamics, we used a continuous flash 
suppression (CFS, Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005) paradigm, where a faint, moving grating stimulus, 
presented to one eye, was set against a colorful Mondrian suppressor that was displayed to the other. 
This paradigm constitutes a highly biased variant of inter-ocular conflict, where the strength of one 
stimulus (the suppressor) is maximal and the other stimulus can only be perceived when endogenous 
attention is deployed. We varied the degree of coupling between participants' rotational hand action and 
grating stimulus dynamics (fully coupled action, partially coupled action, no action). Observers were 
asked to report on their subjective percept by pressing and holding a button whenever they perceived 
the grating. In addition to this subjective measure that is prone to subjective criterion and response bias, 
and might only reveal percepts that are clearly suprathreshold, we used an additional measure, which 
might reveal effects on the suppressed stimulus: throughout the experiment we measured eye position. 
When the grating becomes dominant, we expect the drifting grating to induce an optokinetic nystagmus 
(OKN). Unlike the button press, which is an all-or-none report, the gain of the OKN slow phase should 
be related to the degree of dominance (cf. Naber, Frässle & Einhäuser, 2011, for the case of BR). 
Hence, we expect that measuring the gain may reveal subtle changes in the visual representation of the 
grating, even if it is still subjectively suppressed from perception. Consequently, we use the OKN gain 
as a measure of whether concurrent action influences the perceptual representation of the grating, both 
above and below perceptual threshold. 
This paradigm is particularly applicable for studying the effects of action on perception, as only one 
stimulus needs to be coupled with the action, while the other remains constant at all times. Since in our 
case, constant action is required, linear hand movements would not be suitable. For eliciting OKN, 
however, the linear translation of the stimulus is necessary. The coupling between rotational input and 
linear output is always arbitrary: as with a rack and pinion mechanism, the direction of coupling 
depends on the relative spatial configuration of the machine. This renders a traditional BR paradigm 
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with two gratings of opposing directions not applicable for our purposes, as coupling the 
manipulandum rotation to one stimulus would also result in an equal coupling to the other. 
As a form of interocular conflict, CFS has close resemblance to BR, although it shows dissimilarities 
beyond the greater exerted strength of suppression (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005; Tsuchiya, Koch, Gilroy & 
Blake, 2006). As detailed above, several cases of dynamic multistable stimuli have been reported 
where action influences perception. Based on these results, we hypothesized an increase in perceived 
strength of the grating when action is coupled to the stimulus' dynamics, as compared to when the same 
visual stimuli are presented without action. The type of measure that would grasp the increased 
perceptual strength of the grating stimulus is not yet entirely clear, as CFS has so far not been used 
extensively in similar settings. However, Levelt’s propositions (Levelt, 1965) appear to frequently 
apply also outside of binocular rivalry paradigms (Brascamp, Klink & Levelt, 2015). Based on these 
observations, we can hypothesize that larger perceived strength would be expressed in an increase of 
the grating’s predominance (dominance as proportion of time throughout the experiment) and in a 
decrease of the suppressor’s dominance duration (mean of all the individual dominance periods). If 
viewers perceive the two stimuli as relatively balanced in strength, an increase in the dominance 
duration for the grating stimulus can also be predicted; furthermore, such a change would increase the 
alternation rate between the two stimuli. Besides and in parallel with these changes in subjective 
reports of participants, we also expect to see an increased OKN response to the grating stimulus when it 
is coupled to manual action as opposed to when no action is performed. 
Results from the partially coupled action condition of the experiment will show whether the action-to-
perception transfer depends on the type of coupling. When action is coupled directly to the grating's 
movement, the change in stimulus position is predictable from action. When action is only partially 
coupled, the action remains task-relevant and still has an effect on stimulus dynamics; however, exact 
stimulus parameters cannot be estimated. If such perceptual estimates are not necessary for the action-
to-perception transfer to take place, we would see similar results with partially coupled action as with 
full coupling. If, on the other hand, matching dynamics between action and perception do play a role in 
the expected facilitation, results will be either identical to when no action is required, or somewhere 
between the no action and fully coupled action conditions. 
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Methods 
Participants 
Twenty-four students (15 female, 9 male, 4 left handed, mean age = 24.4 SD = 5.8) took part in the 
experiment. All of them were naïve to the purpose of the experiment, had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and normal stereo vision, and gave written informed consent to their partaking. All 
procedures conformed to the Declaration of Helsinki and were approved by the applicable board 
("Ethikkommission FB04, Philipps-University Marburg"). 
 
Setup and stimuli 
Manual action was tracked by a custom-built manipulandum device (Fig. 1). The manipulandum 
consisted of a horizontal disk of 9 cm radius, which had an 11.5 cm long handle mounted perpendicular 
to the disk at 5 cm distance from the center. To track the angular position of the handle, the axis of the 
disk operated a Kübler Sendix 5020 incremental rotary encoder. Stimuli were generated using Matlab 
(Mathworks, Natick, MA) and the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). Presentation 
took place at a viewing distance of 30 cm on two 21-inch Syncmaster CRT screens (Samsung, Seoul, 
South Korea), at 1280 × 1024 pixels spatial and 85 Hz temporal resolution. A mirror stereoscope with 
cold (infrared-transparent) mirrors (Naber et al., 2011) allowed for simultaneous dichoptic stimulus 
presentation and noninvasive infrared eye-tracking of one eye at 1000 Hz (EyeLink 2000, SR Research, 
Ottawa, ON, Canada with the Eyelink toolbox, Cornelissen, Peters & Palmer, 2002). Since the eye-
movement characteristics that we needed to analyze for the purpose of this study are equitably carried 
by both eyes (Naber et al., 2011), binocular tracking was not necessary. 
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Figure 1. Experimental setup. The cold mirrors of the stereoscope allowed eye-tracking from a table-
mounted camera position as seen in the image. The manipulandum device (bottom right) was not 
visible to participants during the experiment. The experiment was carried out in a dark room. 
Each eye's stimulus was centrally presented within a red annulus (inner diameter: 34 degrees), to 
ensure fusional vergence. The suppressor stimulus completely filled this ring and consisted of 
overlapping rectangles of random size and color, presented with a refresh rate of 10 Hz. The target 
stimulus was a horizontally transposing, red, sine-wave grating on black background. The grating's 
spatial frequency was 0.18 cycles per degree and its total diameter extended 28 degrees. A Gaussian 
mask, centered within the red annulus, decreased the grating’s luminance towards the edges (Fig. 2). 
Part II. – Appendix: Study II.   
 
63 
 
Figure 2. Stimulus. Stimulus display. The dashed line was added to indicate the separation between 
the two eyes’ stimuli. 
 
Procedure 
The experiment consisted of three conditions, presented in separate blocks in an alternating fashion. In 
all conditions, the task of participants was to try and perceive the moving grating stimulus as dominant. 
They were also instructed to indicate their percepts by keeping a button pressed all the time when full 
dominance of the target was achieved, and released when the suppressor was dominant. For all 
participants, button presses were executed with the left hand, while the manipulandum was operated 
with the right. 
In the "coupled action" (CA) condition, participants were instructed to continually rotate the 
manipulandum in the predefined direction at the velocity of their choosing. Grating velocity was 
directly coupled to this action at a fixed rate. 
In the "decoupled action" (DA) condition, participants executed the same task as in the CA condition, 
but their action was largely decoupled from the grating's dynamics. The dynamics of the last completed 
CA block in the experiment was replayed and averaged with the participant's concurrent action with a 
weight of 4:5. By the concurrent action having only a weight of 1:5, no moment-by-moment prediction 
could be made regarding the velocity of the grating, while the participant still had some effect on the 
overall dynamics of the stimulus. 
In action blocks (conditions CA & DA), continuous rotation in the correct direction was invoked. If the 
participant stopped rotating or rotated in the wrong direction, a red rectangle in the center of the stimuli 
on both screens warned them. Block #2 (first DA block) of participant #12 was removed from analysis 
due to a failure of following the rotation instructions for 92.04 % of the total duration of the block. In 
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all other blocks and participants, the ratio of erroneous rotation remained negligible (mean = 0.55 %, 
SD = 0.76 %). 
In the "no action" (NA) condition, participants were instructed to perform no rotation, while keeping 
their hands on the manipulandum lever. Stimulus dynamics were entirely determined by the replay of 
the last completed CA block. 
Experimenter and participant only knew whether action was required or a NA block was conducted, but 
were both blinded to whether a block, in which manual action was required, was CA or DA. 
Participants in addition were naïve to the fact that two different blocks with movement existed. 
The grating's direction was counterbalanced between blocks, while the directional pairing between 
grating translation and manual action was locked: clockwise action was coupled with leftwards and 
counter-clockwise action with rightwards motion of the grating stimulus, such that the grating 
corresponded to the movement when the lever was in front. 
Each participant started the experiment with a training block, where the grating stimulus was first 
introduced separately. This assured that all participants had the same amount of knowledge as for what 
the target looked like, regardless of their subsequent performance in the binocular task. Following the 
training, they completed twelve blocks, with block order following a counterbalanced design between 
the three conditions (four blocks each). Each block was preceded by an eye tracker calibration and 
lasted 200 s. In those cases when the experiment started with DA or NA blocks (thus no action of the 
given participant was recorded yet), stimulus dynamics of the last CA block of the previous participant 
were replayed. For all other DA and NA blocks, recordings of the last CA block of the given 
participant were used. This allowed us to have a counterbalanced design while maximizing the 
similarity in stimulus dynamics between conditions. 
 
Analyses 
Button press responses were analyzed by comparing conditions in the following measures: 
predominance of the grating (overall dominance rate throughout the whole experiment), dominance 
durations (average length of individual dominance periods) for the grating stimulus and for the 
suppressor, and switching frequency between the two stimuli. Eye data were analyzed by similarly 
comparing the mean gain of the OKN slow phase (eye velocity as a portion of stimulus velocity). This 
measure was achieved by, first, removing OKN fast phases and blinks, using the in-built Eyelink 
saccade detection software with the parameters of 30 degrees/s velocity threshold and 8000 degrees/s2 
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acceleration threshold. The average horizontal velocity of OKN slow phases was then calculated by 
least-squares fitting a linear function to each of the remaining sections. Giving this value the 
appropriate sign (positive if the slow phase was in the direction of the stimulus in the given block) and 
dividing it by stimulus velocity yielded the gain of eye movements, at each time point of the 
experiment where no saccade or blink occurred (Fig. 3). Note that the gain is negative, if the slow 
phase of the OKN is directed opposite to the grating’s drift direction, and positive if both are in the 
same direction. Perfect OKN would imply a gain of 100 %. 
 
Figure 3. Example excerpt of participant #6. Button press (green areas across both graphs; indicating 
subjective perceptual dominance of the grating), raw data of horizontal eye movements (blue line), and 
gain (red line; least-squares mean velocity of slow phase eye movements as portion of stimulus 
velocity). 
 
Measures were averaged across blocks for each condition and participant, and compared in a within-
subjects repeated measures ANOVA. In cases where Mauchly’s test indicated a violation of the 
sphericity assumption, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected values were used. Post-hoc t tests were carried 
out between all condition-pairs, if the variance analysis showed a main effect at a 0.05 alpha level. For 
post-hoc tests, significance was asserted only when the p value fell below a Bonferroni-adjusted alpha-
level of 0.05/3 = 0.0167. For analyses on button press measures, blocks with no button press (12 blocks 
altogether across all participants) were treated as missing values. 
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Time-normalized analysis 
For a more detailed view of temporal relationships between eye movements and the reported percept, 
we compared the gain for each condition on a scale of normalized time between button press and 
release. The absolute durations of individual segments from one perceptual switch to the other are 
variable between participants as well as between the two perceptual interpretations (dominance of 
grating or suppressor). In order to compare conditions and perceptual dominance without a bias by the 
absolute duration of the percept, gain data for individual intervals between perceptual switches were 
normalized to unit time (see also Einhäuser, Martin & König, 2004). The gain trace between each 
button release and subsequent button press (and vice versa) was mapped by linear interpolation to 
10000 data-points referred to as interval [0, 1], prior to averaging these segments. In this time frame, 
unit time corresponds to one half cycle between two consecutive button presses. 
To circumvent the multiple comparisons problem in studying a large number of points on the time-
scale, conditions were analyzed in a between-trials cluster-based non-parametric test on the time-
normalized data, separately for intervals where the grating or the suppressor was dominant. Methods 
were based on Maris & Oostenveld (2007). In short, t values were obtained from a pair-wise 
comparison of conditions at all data points of the time normalized scale. Clusters were formed where 
paired t tests resulted in statistics with t > 2. Gaps between clusters were ignored when they did not 
exceed 0.5 % of the normalized time scale (corresponding to an average of 44.2 ms in the real-time 
data). Note that these thresholds do not affect the false alarm rate in the non-parametric test, they only 
set the sensitivity for localizing the clusters. The sum of t values in the largest cluster was recorded as 
the observed test statistic. To form random partitions, trials (averages across blocks per participant) of 
the different conditions were collected in a single data set, and new subsets of equal sizes were formed 
by random draws of trials. Test statistics were calculated on these random subsets similarly to that on 
the actual conditions. By repeating the above method of random partitions 1000 times, Monte Carlo p 
values were calculated by taking the proportion of random partitions that showed a larger test statistic 
than the observed test statistic. 
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Results 
Subjective report and gain 
Button press responses showed no significant difference between conditions in any of the examined 
variables. Gain evinced to be different between conditions when data were considered irrespective of 
button press data (Table 1). Here, pair-wise comparisons revealed a significant difference between CA 
and NA conditions (t(23) = 2.79, p = 0.010) but not between CA and DA (t(23) = 1.72, p = 0.099) or 
DA and NA (t(23) = 1.41, p = 0.173) conditions. In post-hoc contrasts, a linear model showed the best 
fit to the pattern of results (Fig. 4; F(1, 23) = 7.78, ηp
2 = 0.25, p = 0.010). 
 
Figure 4. Means of gain. Groups from left to right: data across the whole experiment, portion of 
experiment when button press report indicated dominance of the grating, and portion of experiment 
when button press report indicated dominance of the suppressor. Error bars show standard errors of the 
mean. 
  
overall grating reported dominant
Subjective Report
Ga
in 
(%
)
suppressor reported dominant
0
5
10
15
20
coupled action (CA)
decoupled action (DA)
no action (NA)
Part II. – Appendix: Study II.   
 
68 
 
Variable Unit 
Condition df F ηp
2 p 
CA DA NA     
Predominance 
(grating) 
% 
38.47 
(25.93) 
38.82 
(28.80) 
38.05 
(28.56) 
2, 46 0.17 0.007 0.844 
Dominance 
duration 
(grating) 
s 
7.74 
(11.81) 
8.64 
(14.05) 
8.73 
(14.61) 
1.32, 
30.25 
0.39 0.017 0.595 
Dominance 
duration 
(suppressor) 
s 
8.61 
(6.45) 
8.49 
(8.28) 
10.04 
(9.97) 
2, 46 0.73 0.031 0.486 
Switching 
frequency 
1/s 
0.21 
(0.15) 
0.20 
(0.15) 
0.21 
(0.17) 
1.40, 
32.24 
0.69 0.029 0.459 
Gain (overall) % 
10.40 
(7.89) 
9.78 
(7.51) 
9.13 
(7.52) 
2, 46 4.40 0.161 0.018* 
Gain (grating 
dominant) 
% 
16.95 
(11.46) 
16.48 
(10.91) 
15.17 
(9.86) 
1.54, 
35.49 
2.84 0.110 0.084 
Gain 
(suppressor 
dominant) 
% 
7.52 
(5.55) 
7.34 
(6.05) 
6.99 
(6.85) 
2, 46 0.86 0.036 0.432 
 
Table 1. Statistical measures of results from perceptual reports and eye movements (gain). Means 
and standard deviations are shown for all variables and conditions (CA: coupled action, DA: decoupled 
action, NA: no action). Predominance of grating: portion of the experiment’s total duration, when 
perceptual dominance of the grating was indicated by button press. Dominance duration: average time 
of dominance between reported perceptual switches. Switching frequency: number of switches per 
second. Gain: slow phase optokinetic nystagmus velocity as portion of stimulus velocity. 
 
Time-normalized analysis 
For periods in which participants reported dominance of the grating, non-parametric test results 
revealed significant differences at a critical alpha-level of p < 0.05 between each condition pair (pCA-DA 
= 0.041; pDA-NA = 0.034; pCA-NA = 0.016). In contrast, for periods in which participants reported the 
flash to be dominant, only the CA-NA comparison reached significance (pCA-DA = 0.103; pDA-NA = 
0.120; pCA-NA = 0.048). More interestingly, the largest clusters of difference occurred at dissimilar 
temporal positions relative to the reported dominance switches (Fig. 5). For comparisons between 
action conditions (CA and DA) and the NA conditions, clusters were found where the gain was highest 
(proximal to when the grating achieved dominance). However, CA and DA conditions differed the 
most during times when gain was low (nearby the end of the grating’s dominance). 
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Figure 5. Means of gain, t values, and largest clusters on a normalized time scale. Left panels: 
intervals during which button presses indicated dominance of the grating, horizontal (time) axes are 
normalized such that this interval is mapped to unit time, with 0 being the time of press and 1 the time 
of release. Right panels: intervals during which button presses indicated dominance of the suppressor, 
time axes normalized to unit time from button release (t=0) to subsequent press (t=1). Means of gain 
are plotted based on individual segments of dominance normalized to this time scale. Conditions are 
compared in paired samples t tests across time. Test statistics are plotted for each condition pair, with 
the largest clusters of difference highlighted in grey (for details, see Analyses). 
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Discussion 
Our results show that reported percept and eye-movement behavior are affected differently by action. 
Although earlier studies with ambiguous displays (Beets et al., 2010; Mitsumatsu, 2009; Wohlschläger, 
2000) and BR (Di Pace & Saracini, 2014; Maruya et al., 2007) have shown a clear effect of concurrent, 
task-related action on perception, we did not find any sign of such an effect in a CFS paradigm. This is 
consistent with the top-down nature of action capture (Wohlschläger, 2000), as the effect of selective 
attention is weaker in CFS compared to BR, and minimal compared to ambiguous figures (Meng & 
Tong, 2006; Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005; Tsuchiya, Koch, Gilroy & Blake, 2006). 
Visually induced eye-movements, on the other hand, were affected by action, pointing to an underlying 
mechanism that is either different from that behind the action-to-perception transfer onto the conscious 
percept, or relies on the same mechanism albeit with diverging sensitivities. While comparing the 
means of the gain during times of dominance of one or the other stimulus did not show clearly whether 
the effect stemmed from intervals of the experiment when dominance of the grating was indicated or 
from the portion when the suppressor was dominant, non-parametric test results showed that the effect 
was not distributed homogeneously across the time of dominance of either stimulus. As opposed to 
binary button press responses, the gain of OKN eye movements showed a gradual transition of 
dominance between suppressor and target stimulus (cf. Fahle, Stemmler, & Spang 2011; Naber et al., 
2011). Relative to these transitions, the effect of (both coupled and decoupled) action as compared to 
no action was most expressed when eye movements elicited by the grating were highest. However, 
coupled and decoupled action conditions differed from one another mostly at times when the gain of 
OKN was at its lowest (Fig. 5). This means that not only were eye movements affected by action 
independently of the reported percept of the stimulus, but also that most of the effect of coupling 
between action and stimulus dynamics took place when the coupled stimulus was least likely to be in 
awareness. 
Our paradigm tackles an earlier stage of competition than all previously reported experiments on the 
action-to-perception transfer. As such, the measures that we used reflect a stronger influence of bottom-
up processes, while selective attention could less readily bias the percept. This is feasible to be 
reflected in the lack of an on-line action to perception effect on the reported percept in our results. Eye 
movements, on the other hand, respond to a lower level of shared processing between action and 
perception, and display a gradual effect of action – the degree of coupling corresponds to the extent of 
OKN response to the grating‘s motion. 
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Although eye movements are a type of motor behavior, in our experiment they are inseparable from the 
visual information that originates from the target stimulus. It remains an open question, to what extent 
the underlying perceptual processes also differ between the tested conditions. Nevertheless, as the 
OKN response is reliably connected to the percept in BR (Naber et al., 2011), we can assume that 
lower level (pre-attentive) perceptual processes are affected by action, similarly to eye movements. The 
difference between our results and those of Maruya et al. (2007) and Di Pace & Saracini (2014), on the 
other hand, further support the notion that BR and CFS are principally different in how they affect 
selective attention and awareness (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005; Tsuchiya et al., 2006). 
One of the earliest and theoretically most important questions of the study of how action influences 
perception is whether any observed effect is a result of a direct, low level, information flow from the 
motor to the perceptual domain, or if higher level representations or even endogenous attention serve as 
vehicle for the transfer. A collection of results from previous research together indicate that neither side 
can be clearly excluded from an overarching explanation. Our study takes this approach one step 
further. On one hand, it shows that in CFS, a paradigm where selective attention plays less role than in 
ambiguous figures or BR, effects of action on perception can still be observed. On the other hand, it 
also shows that methods most often used in similar studies, which rely on observers’ subjective reports, 
do not capture the effect. This is an indication that conscious perception is not affected at the measured 
level of perceptual organization. 
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Abstract 
Can cognition penetrate action-to-perception transfer? Participants observed a cylinder of ambiguous 
rotation direction. Beforehand, they experienced one of two mechanical models: an unambiguous 
cylinder was connected to a rod by either a belt (cylinder and rod rotating in the same direction) or 
gears (both rotating opposite). During ambiguous cylinder presentation, mechanics and rod were 
invisible. Observers inferred the rod’s direction from their moment-by-moment subjective perceptual 
interpretation of the cylinder. Observers reported the (hidden) rod’s direction by rotating a 
manipulandum in either the same or the opposite direction. For the “belt” model, same-direction report 
induces congruency between cylinder perception and manual action. Here, same-direction movement 
stabilized the perceived direction, replicating a known congruency effect. For the “gear” model, 
opposite-direction report induces congruency between perception and action. Here, no congruency 
effect was found: perceptual congruency and cognitive model nullified each other. Hence, observers’ 
internal models of a machine’s operation guide action-to-perception transfer. 
 
Keywords: vision, action, ambiguous perception, action-perception coupling, cognitive representation, 
action-to-perception transfer 
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Introduction 
Actions typically have perceptual consequences. Pushing a mouse forward makes a pointer go up, 
pulling a control stick backward makes a plane climb, pulling a cord down opens the blinds, turning a 
key releases a lock, turning a screw pushes it forward or backward, etc. These mappings from action to 
outcome are vastly different, sometimes even conflicting, yet, they appear nearly self-evident to us. 
Apparently, we have internalized models of the complex mappings between actions and their effects 
and can recruit them in a context-specific manner. In the present study, we ask whether these cognitive 
models of action consequences penetrate into perception itself. 
Besides affecting perception through changing the external world, action may also directly impact 
internal perceptual representations. Practicing a movement leads to improved visual discrimination of 
the same movement1, action and the perception of action may rely on the same primitives2, and as 
humans, we are all “experts” on biological motion perception3,4. The notion of shared action-perception 
representations has been formalized as the theory of common coding5 and extended into the theory of 
event coding6. 
Ambiguous stimuli present an excellent means of isolating direct effects of action on perception from 
effects that are mediated through changes in the outside world. For example, when two identical disks 
move across the screen on the same trajectory but in the opposite direction7, the direction of a 
concurrently performed hand action biased the percept to either the two disks moving across or 
bouncing off one another8. Wohlschläger9 demonstrated that planning or executing a hand movement 
biased a rotating ambiguous motion display in the direction of manual rotation. Similarly, the 
perceptual interpretation of an ambiguous (bi-stable) rotating cylinder was stabilized, when viewers 
reported their perceived direction with congruent manual rotation10. Comparable results were found 
when instead of ambiguous displays, binocular rivalry11 or unambiguous stimuli with high perceptual 
uncertainty12 were used. These studies describe a congruency effect, whereby a match between action 
and perception (e.g., rotation in the same direction) leads to increased perceptual stability, as compared 
to an incongruent relationship (rotation in the opposite direction). 
Although the theory of common coding5 can accommodate all of the aforementioned findings, it does 
not strictly specify the nature of the information transfer from action to perception. One possibility is 
that the action-to-perception transfer is mediated by cognition. Maruya, Yang and Blake11 found effects 
of action on perception, when the action-coupled stimulus was perceptually suppressed (i.e., outside of 
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awareness), arguing against a purely cognitive effect. In contrast, Beets and colleagues10 found effects 
only when the action was used to report the perception, suggesting the need for some cognitive 
component. 
In the present study, we used an ambiguous motion stimulus to assess the impact of cognition on 
action-to-perception transfer. Specifically, we tested whether an observer’s internal model of the 
particular mechanics that link the action to the observed visual consequence modulates the effect of 
action on perception. In all experimental conditions, observers viewed an ambiguous rotating cylinder 
(figure 1b; Beets et al.10) and reported perceived spinning direction by rotating a manipulandum lever 
either in the same or in the opposite direction as the lever of the assumed mechanism would move 
(figure 1c, d). 
 
Figure 1. Stimuli, percept, and task. a) First, in separate blocks (blocks 1 & 6, see table 2), 
participants were introduced to the mechanical model (“belt” or “gear” layout). For 30 seconds, they 
controlled the displayed motion with the manipulandum. Then, 20 seconds of unambiguous motion 
followed (the cylinder and mechanical model rotated with occasional switches in direction), where 
rotation direction in 
mental model
direction instruction 
(rel. mental model)
rotation direction of 
subjective percept
test stimulus
(ambiguous)
training stimulus
SAME OPPOSITE
SAME OPPOSITE
SAME OPPOSITE
SAME OPPOSITE
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LT
G
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observers had to report the rotation of the red lever (the red rod attached to the wheel) in accordance 
with the subsequent experimental block (“same direction instruction” or “opposite direction 
instruction”). For the last 20 seconds of training, the red lever disappeared and the mechanics was 
covered by a virtual desk, while the task remained unchanged. b) All test blocks showed the same, 
ambiguous, motion cylinder for 3 minutes each. c) Two possible perceptual interpretations of the test 
stimulus (clockwise and counter-clockwise). Participants had to respond to the imagined motion of the 
red lever, as it related to their current percept. d) Instruction (manipulandum rotation in the same or 
opposite direction as that of the red lever in the mental model). Note that in the “belt” condition, the 
same/opposite direction instruction leads to congruency/incongruency between perceived and 
performed rotation, while this relationship is reversed in the “gear” condition. 
 
Ambiguous stimuli evoke a percept that switches back and forth between perceptual interpretations 
(here: one direction of rotation or the other). A more stable percept translates to longer periods between 
these switches. Hence perceptual stability is operationalized as the median duration for which a percept 
(of either rotation direction) was perceived. 
Studies like Wohlschläger9 or Beets and colleagues10, by design, confound two effects: (i) the effect of 
coupling between the perceived direction of the ambiguous motion and the manipulandum rotation and 
(ii) the effect of coupling between the internal model of the rotation and the executed movement. There 
is an implicit assumption that the cognitive model and the perception are closely matched. Here we 
separate these two effects: as in Beets and collagues10, we used an ambiguous cylinder (figure 1b) and 
asked observers to rotate a manipulandum in the same or in a different direction as an ambiguously 
rotating object. However, observers did not report the perceived direction of the ambiguous cylinder 
itself, but of a visual representation of the manipulandum lever. Observers were taught that the 
ambiguous cylinder and the lever were either coupled through a belt or through gears (figure 1a). This 
results in four (2x2) conditions (table 1): the internal model (levels: “gear”, “belt”) and the match 
between perceived cylinder rotation and manipulandum rotation (levels: “congruent”, “incongruent”). 
During testing, the visual representation of the lever is not shown (figure 1b), rendering all four 
conditions visually identical. If the congruency between perceived motion direction and manipulandum 
rotation is decisive for action-perception coupling, the effect of the match between action and 
perception on perceptual stability should be independent of the internal model (figure 2, left). If, 
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however, the cognitive congruency between the invisible representation of the lever and actual lever is 
decisive, we expect the effects to reverse for the gear model (figure 2, right). Even if the effect does not 
reverse completely, any interaction between internal model and perception-action match would point to 
cognitive penetration of action-perception coupling. 
internal 
model 
match (perceived rotation – 
manual action) 
instruction effect if perception 
dominates 
effect if internal model 
dominates 
belt congruent same dir. stabilize stabilize 
belt incongruent opposite dir. destabilize destabilize 
gear incongruent same dir. destabilize stabilize 
gear congruent opposite dir. stabilize destabilize 
Table 1. Conditions. There are 4 (2x2) experimental conditions, defined by the factors internal model 
(“belt”, “gear”) and match (“congruent”, “incongruent”). Note that match and instruction in the belt 
and gear conditions are inversely related. Depending on whether perceptual congruency or internal 
model dominates, different predictions on perceptual (de)stabilization result (right columns). 
 
Figure 2. Hypotheses. Expected effects of internal model and match (between percept and action) on 
perceptual stability, if action-perception coupling is not under cognitive influence (left) or dominated 
by the cognitive model (right). 
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Results 
We measured perceptual stability and tested whether the factors internal model [gear vs. belt] and 
match [congruent vs. incongruent] influenced this measure. We found no significant main effect of 
either factor (internal model: F(1, 31) = 0.517, ηp
2 = 0.016, p = 0.478; match: F(1, 31) = 2.697, ηp
2 = 
0.080, p = 0.111), while the two factors showed a significant interaction (F(1, 31) = 4.763, ηp
2 = 0.133, 
p = 0.037). Paired samples two-sided t-tests revealed that the congruency effect was significant only in 
the “belt” condition (perceptual stability: meanBelt Congruent = 4.40 s; meanBelt Incongruent = 3.24 s; t(31) = 
2.759, p = 0.010), but not in the “gear” condition (meanGear Congruent = 3.39 s; meanGear Incongruent = 3.67 s; 
t(31) = 0.661, p = 0.513; figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. Results. Perceptual stability for each condition, averaged across participants (N=32; mean 
perceptual stability across observers, where perceptual stability for each observer is the median 
duration for which a percept was perceived). Error bars show standard errors of the mean. 
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Discussion 
The interaction between the factors internal model and match revealed that the cognitive model of the 
coupling between an action and its observable effect significantly influenced the action-to-perception 
transfer. Results from the “belt” condition replicated the known congruency effect10, while the lack of 
effect in the “gear” condition (in the presence of an interaction) showed that the influence of the 
assumed mechanical model counteracted the natural congruency bias. Thus, cognition plays a 
significant role in action-to-perception transfer, while it is not the sole source of the effect. 
In the framework of the common-coding theory5, our results can be interpreted as evidence that the 
shared representations between perception and action occur on a cognitively accessible level of 
processing. This is in line with the observation that action-perception transfer can depend on the 
relevance of an action for the perceptual task10. A direct influence of the cognitive model on action-to-
perception transfer might also be of adaptive value in real-life situations, in particular when tools 
similar to the one used here are involved: evoking a cognitive model allows better predictions of an 
action’s consequences and may therefore result in better performance or quicker learning of a complex 
manual task13. Nonetheless, our results do not exclude that on some level shared action-perception 
representations exist that are under less cognitive control and form independently of awareness11. This 
is particularly conceivable for low-level representations, where perception itself may remain unaffected 
by either action or the cognitive expectation of perception-action coupling14. In a representation-based 
framework, the results on action-perception transfer taken together necessitate different 
representational levels, of which only some are penetrable to executive functions, awareness or 
cognition. 
A complementary view posits that the quality of perception arises from the relation between our actions 
and their sensory effects15. Perception, cognition and action then become intimately related through the 
model that is generated by observing the sensory consequences of an action. In this case, perceptual 
qualities and the cognitive model can be viewed as consequences of the action-perception relation. This 
is consistent with a recently proposed action-oriented framework, in which perception and cognition 
are formed together, with action being the key organizing force behind both16. In a simple system like 
the gear/belt mechanics, it would appear conceivable that instruction led the observers to simply learn 
the coupling from action-to-perception without forming a cognitive model. However, we deliberately 
chose an experimental design that reversed the congruency instruction without re-exposing the 
observers to the action-perception coupling; instead, we exposed each observer to their second 
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mechanical model only after he or she had completed all blocks with the first model (order of 
mechanics balanced across observers; table 2). Observers therefore needed to apply their internal 
mechanical model to reverse the instruction without practicing the action-perception contingency. This 
makes it likely that observers indeed have formed a cognitive model during instruction, which they 
consistently applied until a different model became evident through a new, externally available, action-
perception contingency. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
Thirty-two naïve participants (15 males, 17 females; 25 +/- 4.6 years; 4 left- and 28 right-handed) were 
included in the analysis. In one additional observer, no reversal of their rotation occurred in several 
blocks; this was detected when visually inspecting data quality, and the data of this observer was 
excluded prior to any further analysis. One further observer was assigned to a wrong group by technical 
error, which was realized during the experiment and their data was not analyzed or inspected any 
further. Procedures conformed to the Declaration of Helsinki and were approved by the 
Ethikkommission FB04 of Philipps-University Marburg (#2011-04K). Participants gave written 
informed consent prior to their partaking. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
Setup and stimuli 
Stimuli were generated using Unity3D (Unity Technologies, San Francisco, CA) and Matlab 
(Mathworks, Natick, MA) with the Psychophysics Toolbox17,18, and presented on an Asus GL502 
laptop computer (screen resolution: 1920 x 1080 at 60 Hz; viewing distance: 73 cm). Manual responses 
were recorded by a custom-built manipulandum device (figure 1d shows an image of the device), 
measuring the angular position of the rotating handle via a Kübler Sendix 5020 incremental rotary 
encoder. For all participants, the manipulandum was placed on the right side of the chair. 
For training blocks, stimuli were rendered with a perspective camera and other depth-cues present. The 
3-dimensional model of the cylinder consisted of small spheres placed at equal distances from a 
vertical axis, with randomly defined vertical and angular positions relative to the axis. The total size of 
the display extended 14.4 x 11.7 degrees of visual angle, with the diameter of each dot being 0.08 
degrees. The mechanical model consisted of either two wheels connected by a belt, or two adjacent 
cogwheels. The wheels moved according to the type of connection, that is, same direction in the “belt” 
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condition and opposite direction in the “gear” condition. One of the wheels was placed directly below 
the cylinder and always moved together with it, as if they were fastened together. This wheel, as well 
as the cylinder, was shown in the center of the screen. The second wheel was to the right, with a 
vertical red rod attached to the top side (resembling the handle of the manipulandum; see figure 1a). 
For test blocks, the same cylinder object was depicted in the center (6.1 x 12.7 degrees) as an 
orthographic projection, without depth-cues or the attached mechanical model (figure 1b). This way, 
the direction of rotation was completely ambiguous and up to the perceptual interpretation of the 
viewer. The spheres of the cylinder were shown in a homogeneous color (appearing as 2-dimensional 
dots) and their size did not change along their movement trajectory. Thus, the front and rear surfaces of 
the cylinder were identical and showed no cues of occlusion. However, due to the dynamics of the dot 
movements, this cylinder formation is consistently perceived as a 3-dimensional rotating object 
(structure-from-motion), where the apparent direction of rotation is ambiguous and its perception 
alternates (see e.g. Beets et al.10). 
Procedure 
For each participant, the experiment consisted of two halves, one with the “belt” and the other with the 
“gear” stimulus condition (order counterbalanced between participants). Each half of the whole 
experiment started with a training block that introduced the stimulus and mechanical model of the 
applicable condition, followed by four test blocks with the ambiguous stimulus (table 2). 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
mechanics 
training 
(total: 70s) 
test (180s) test (180s) test (180s) test (180s) 
mechanics 
training 
(total: 70s) 
test (180s) test (180s) test (180s) test (180s) 
I belt S O O S gear S O O S 
II gear S O O S belt S O O S 
III belt S O O S gear O S S O 
IV gear S O O S belt O S S O 
V belt O S S O gear S O O S 
VI gear O S S O belt S O O S 
VII belt O S S O gear O S S O 
VIII gear O S S O belt O S S O 
Table 2. Design matrix. Within a sequence of test blocks, order of reporting conditions follows an 
ABBA pattern (either SOOS or OSSO; S: same direction instruction, O: opposite direction instruction). 
The starting of the sequence and all other variables of the design were counterbalanced between 
participants, leading to a total of 8 possible block order combinations; that is, each block order (I-VIII) 
was assigned to four of the 32 observers. 
 
The training blocks were designed to gradually introduce model and task to the participant. In the first 
30 seconds, the movement of the unambiguous cylinder and the attached mechanical model were 
directly connected to the manipulandum lever. Participants were instructed to move the lever as they 
wished and to observe the mechanical workings of the model. Then, for a 20 seconds interval, the 
model rotated at a constant velocity, changing direction every 6 +/- 2 seconds. Participants had to either 
mimic the movement of the red rod on the attached wheel, or rotate in the opposite direction (according 
to what the instruction would be in the subsequent test block). In the last 20 seconds of the training 
block, participants continued with their previous task but the red rod disappeared, and the mechanics 
were occluded by a virtual desk. This way, the movement of the cylinder was still unambiguous, but 
the task of the participant was already identical to what they would do in the subsequent test block. To 
make certain that the correct response was practiced, a salient red rod appeared directly to the left of 
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the cylinder, when the response direction was incorrect. Furthermore, the experimenter was also 
present during the training block and verified that by the end of the instruction, all participants 
understood the current task. 
Test blocks always showed the ambiguous stimulus (figure 1b), moving at a constant velocity (90°/s). 
Depending on the condition of the given block, participants had to move the manipulandum lever in the 
same or opposite direction as the red lever on the mechanics (as seen in the training block) would 
rotate. Test blocks lasted 3 minutes each. Before each block, the starting position of the manipulandum 
lever was set to the 12 o’clock position. 
The order of training stimulus (“belt” or “gear” mechanics) between the two halves of the experiment, 
the order of test block instructions within one half of the experiment (same or opposite direction; 
always in an ABBA order), as well as the order of test block instructions between the two halves of the 
experiment were counterbalanced between participants (table 2). 
Analysis 
Manipulandum rotation velocity data were segmented into periods of rotation in one direction or the 
other, as well as periods with no movement (no change of position for at least two subsequent sample 
points). For each observer and condition, perceptual stability was defined as the median duration of all 
non-zero velocity segments. 
Comparisons between conditions were made using a within-subjects repeated measures ANOVA, with 
factors internal model (“belt” or “gear”) and match (congruent and incongruent, as in the relation 
between stimulus and action). Effects were considered significant at a 0.05 alpha level, while a 
Bonferroni-adjusted alpha-level of 0.05/4 = 0.0125 was used for post-hoc t-tests.  
All reported tests are two-sided, Matlab (R2015a) was used for data processing, SPSS (version 24) for 
statistical analysis.  
Part II. – Appendix: Study III.   
 
86 
References 
1. Casile, A. & Giese, M. A. Nonvisual motor training influences biological motion perception. Curr. Biol. 16, 69-74 
(2006). 
2. Mataric, M. J. Sensory-motor primitives as a basis for imitation: Linking perception to action and biology to robotics in 
Imitation in Animals and Artifacts (ed. C. Nehaniv & K. Dautenhahn) 391-422 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000). 
3. Troje, N. F. Biological motion perception in The Senses: A Comprehensive Reference (ed. A. I. Basbaum, M. C. 
Bushnell, D. V. Smith, G. K. Beauchamp, S. J. Firestein, P. Dallos, D. Oertel, R. H. Masland, T. D. Albright, J. H. Kaas 
& E. P. Gardner) 231-238 (Oxford: Elsevier, 2008). 
4. Troje, N. F. What is biological motion?: Definition, stimuli and paradigms in Social Perception: Detection and 
Interpretation of Animacy, Agency, and Intention (ed. M. D. Rutherford & V. A. Kuhlmeier) 13-36 (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2013). 
5. Prinz, W. Perception and action planning. Eur. J. Cogn. Psychol. 9, 129-154 (1997). 
6. Müsseler, J. How independent from action is perception? An event-coding account for more equally-ranked crosstalks in 
Cognitive Contributions to the Perception of Spatial and Temporal Events (ed. G. Aschersleben, T. Bachman & J. 
Müsseler) 121-147 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1999). 
7. Metzger, W. Beobachtung über phänomenale Identität. Psychol. Res. 19, 1-60 (1934). 
8. Mitsumatsu, H. Voluntary action affects perception of bistable motion display. Percept. 38, 1522-1535 (2009). 
9. Wohlschläger, A. Visual motion priming by invisible actions. Vis. Res. 40, 925-930 (2000). 
10. Beets, I. A. M., ‘t Hart, B. M., Rösler, F., Henriques, D. Y. P., Einhäuser, W. & Fiehler, K. Online action-to-perception 
transfer: Only percept-dependent action affects perception. Vis. Res. 50, 1633-1641 (2010). 
11. Maruya, K., Yang, E. & Blake, R. Voluntary action influences visual competition. Psychol. Sci. 18, 1090-1098 (2007). 
12. Keetels, M. & Stekelenburg, J. J. Motor-induced visual motion: Hand movements driving visual motion perception. Exp. 
Brain Res. 232 2865-2877 (2014). 
13. Lupyan, G. Cognitive penetrability of perception in the age of prediction: Predictive systems are penetrable systems. 
Rev. Philos. Psychol. 6, 547-569 (2015). 
14. Pylyshyn, Z. Is vision continuous with cognition? The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception. Behav. 
Bran Sci. 22, 341-423 (1999). 
15. O'Regan, J. K. & Noë, A. A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. Behav. Brain Sci. 24, 939-1031 
(2001). 
16. Engel, A. K., Maye, A., Kurthen, M. & König, P. Where’s the action? The pragmatic turn in cognitive science. Trends 
Cogn. Sci. 17, 202-209 (2013). 
17. Brainard, D. H. The psychophysics toolbox. Spatial Vis. 10, 433-436 (1997). 
18. Pelli, D. G. The video toolbox software for visual psychophysics: Transforming numbers into movies. Spatial Vis. 10, 
437-442 (1997). 
 
Part II. – Appendix   
 
87 
Zusammenfassung 
Diese Dissertationsschrift besteht aus drei Studien, die sich mit komplementären Aspekten der 
Handlungs-Wahrnehmungs-Kopplung beschäftigen. In den letzten Jahrzehnten hat in der kognitiven 
Psychologie ein Paradigmenwechsel begonnen: an die Stelle des traditionellen Zugangs - zuerst kommt 
der Reiz, dann folgt die Handlung als bloße Antwort darauf – tritt mehr und mehr ein weniger 
unidirektionales Bild von Handlung und Wahrnehmung. Handlung beeinflusst Wahrnehmung zunächst 
auf mehr oder weniger triviale Weise durch ihren Effekt auf die Außenwelt – wir bewegen uns oder 
unsere Sinnesorgane im Raum oder wir bewegen Objekte. Interessanter ist der interne Einfluss der 
Handlung auf die Wahrnehmung. Studien II und III dieser Arbeit beschäftigen sich direkt mit diesem 
Thema, indem sie den Einfluss der Handlung auf die Wahrnehmung physisch unveränderliche Reize 
untersuchen. Studie I beschäftigt sich mit biologischer Bewegung. In meiner Arbeit lege ich dar, dass 
die Wahrnehmung biologischer Bewegung einen realitätsnahen Spezialfall direkten Handlungs-
Wahrnehmungs-Transfers darstellt. Die Hinweisreize für belebte Fortbewegung werden schnell und 
aufwandsfrei erkannt und erlauben gleichzeitig eine schnelle Aufnahme detaillierter Information über 
den Handelnden, da wir hierbei unsere immense Erfahrung mit der Bewegung unseres eigenen Körpers 
unter Berücksichtigung physikalischer Gesetze zur Interpretation dieser Hinweisreize nutzen können. 
Zusammengefasst ergeben die Studien dieser Arbeit ein frisches Bild der gemeinsamer 
Repräsentationen von Wahrnehmung und Handlung, ihrer perzeptuellen Folgen und ihrer Beziehung zu 
kognitiven Modellen der Welt. 
In Studie I zeigten wir, dass biologischer Bewegung die Wahrnehmung der Größe des Handelnden 
beeinflusst. Ein Reiz, der biologische Bewegung darstellt, wird größer wahrgenommen als ein visuell 
vergleichbarer Kontrollreiz und lässt nachfolgende Reize kleiner erscheinen. Vor dem Hintergrund der 
Wichtigkeit biologischer Bewegung ist dieses Ergebnis mit anderen Studien im Einklang, die 
Wichtigkeit zu wahrgenommener Größe in Beziehung setzen. Die Verbindung zu biologischer 
Bewegung wurde vor dieser Arbeit noch nicht hergestellt. In Studie II verbanden wir einen Reiz, der 
sich mit einem anderen in Wettstreit befand, mehr oder weniger stark mit einer gleichzeitig 
ausgeführten Handlung. Während der Grad der Kopplung zwischen Handlung und Wahrnehmung den 
Bericht der Versuchsperson über die Sichtbarkeit nicht nachweislich beeinflusste, zeigte sich eine 
deutliche Modulation okulomotorischer Maße. Dieses Ergebnis legt verschiedene Stufen der 
Handlungs-Wahrnehmungs-Kopplung auf verschiedenen Repräsentationsstufen nahe, die wiederum 
unterschiedlichen Zugang zu bewusster Wahrnehmung haben. Beeinflusst umgekehrt das kognitive 
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Modell der Welt den Grad der Handlungs-Wahrnehmungs-Kopplung? In Studie III zeigten wir, dass 
der Effekt der Handlungs-Wahrnehmungs-Kongruenz auf die Wahrnehmungsstabilität kritisch vom 
kognitiven Modell der Handlungs-Wahrnehmungs-Kopplung abhängt. Zusammengenommen zeigen 
Studien II und III, dass kein einzelner Mechanismus und keine einzelne Repräsentation allein für alle 
Befunde zur Handlungs-Wahrnehmungs-Kopplung verantwortlich sein können. In der übergreifenden 
Diskussion werde ich die nötigen Anpassungen existierender Modelle betrachten und alternative 
theoretische Ansätze aufzeigen. 
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